UNHCR is deeply concerned about the recent drowning of ten Sri Lankan refugees traveling by boat to India. Many refugees fleeing localized violence are being put at great risk by unscrupulous traffickers who operate unseaworthy and overcrowded vessels.
The drowning on 19 May was the latest in a series of incidents involving Sri Lankan refugees traveling to India, which includes abandonment at sea, capsized vessels, and previous fatalities.
Vulnerable passengers such as women, children and the elderly may be subjected to additional hardship en route, such as sexual and gender-based violence, and a greater susceptibility to adverse weather conditions.
“While everyone has an inalienable right to claim asylum, UNHCR urges those planning on making the perilous journey to Tamil Nadu, to carefully consider the serious dangers they may face,” said Amin Awad, UNHCR Representative in Sri Lanka.
UNHCR continues to work closely on this issue with all concerned parties.
An expression of voice for peace and against war was held at the Lipton Circus in Colombo 07, Sri Lanka on May 29th 2006. People from various parts of the island participated in two hour expression of voice for peace and against war, despite rainy weather. This was organized by the National Peace Council.
The objective of the expression of voice for peace and against war, was to put pressure on the Government of Sri Lanka, and the Liberation tigers of Tamil Eelam. The following demands were put forward by the people, who are opposed to war and violence.
1.stop forthwith the killing of innocent people
2.Comply with the Ceasefire Agreement
3.Commence peace talks immediately
“I want peace, because I want to make friends from the other communities” says Varatharaj Vinothraj (11) from Yatiyanthota
The people from Galle disrtict participating in an expression of voice for peace and against war
Leo Niroshan Darshan Sathasivam, photojournalist of Thinakkural newspaper recording images of the expression of voice for peace and against war
Rev.Sister Placida Leenakaduwa of Fransikan Church in Mattakuliya is holding a placard saying “No War”
People from Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities participated
People’s Voice for Peace
“The children will be killed,if the war starts again” says Santhuni Wadumethirige (11) from Galle
Young Buddhist monks participants
Leaflets are being handed over to the participants
[transCurrents.com] Mahendra Percy Rajapakse now known as Mahinda Rajapakse is perhaps the first Sinhala head of state with a clear and coherent idea of how to resolve the National question also called the ethnic crisis , Tamil issue and Tiger problem. This assertion may run contrary to many assessments that describe Mahinda as being confused and indecisive on how to handle this issue.
This writer too has in earlier columns subscribed to this viewpoint. Evaluating Mahinda’s presidency after six months of being in power provides fresh insight. Rajapakse seems to have definite ideas of why, where and how he is going to arrive at his destination. What he is uncertain about is the when or timing.
This does not of course mean that Rajapakse’s objectives are correct or whether he will be able to achieve them. Another troubling factor is that in the process of trying to achieve these objectives Mahinda may be opening the lid of yet another Pandora’s box. A host of unintended consequences and resultant problems mat arise.
There are also three factors that may inhibit, restrain or even defeat his strategy. Firstly there is the Sinhala domestic constituency. It remains to be seen whether the people will be ready, willing and able to face the consequences of this policy.
Secondly there is the International Community(IC). It is not possible at this juncture to speculate as to whether the IC will go along with Rajapakse or apply brakes and if it is a case of the latter how it would be done. The role of India in this would be of particular importance.
Thirdly there is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and by extension the Sri Lankan Tamil people. The only certain thing in all this is that the LTTE will strenuously oppose Rajapakse. It may even be that the tigers could be the sole deterrent to a policy which if successful can only keep suppressed the minority communities in general and the Tamils in particular.
In such a situation the vast majority of Tamils are likely to back the LTTE directly and indirectly. Even those Tamils who are not supportive of the LTTE will not oppose the tigers . Only a Tamil segment actively collaborating with the Rajapakse regime will be supportive of the GOSL.
There is a mistaken impression among many that Mahinda Rajapakse like his predecessor Chandrika Kumaratunga or chief rival Ranil Wickremasinghe wants to resolve the National question amicably and equitably. This would entail some form of federalism or quasi - federalism. After all he is willing to go in for maximum devolution within a unitary state it is pointed out. Mahinda himself often makes statements to this effect.
Rajapakse is being circumscribed due to his dependency on the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and Jathika Hela Urumaya it is said. There are also other external pressure groups like the Patriotic National Movement. Like SWRD Bandaranaike 50 years aho Mahinda too is unable to do the right thing by the Tamils due to JVP, JHU and PNM constraints it is argued.
This argument could have been true of SWRDB. He was a Westernised Liberal Democrat who donned the national dress and promoted Sinhala and Buddhism to capture votes. He was one of the pioneering Donoughmore Buddhists. The real Solomon wanted to be just by the Tamils after he had opened the floodgates. He could not as the torrents he had released engulfed him. Literally and metaphorically he was destroyed by the very same forces he unleashed to achieve power.
In Mahinda Rajapakse’s case it is different. He is not play acting when he takes flower baskets and trays to the Pansala. The only time he is play acting is when he sits with foreigners talking about serious political reform.The crucial difference between SWRD and Mahinda is that the latter unlike the former really and truly belives in what may be called the Sinhala Buddhist supremacist ideology. Mahinda is of the same mindset as the JVP, JHU and PNM. He is not their unwilling captive. If that ideology is indeed restrictive then it is a state which Mahinda has willingly chosen and will not come out of.
Rajapakse was born in 1946 but he is in reality the politically quintessential child of 1956 (Panashaye Daruwo) Mahinda believes that the Sinhala Buddhists are the rightful and sole heirs to this Island. The Sinhala Buddhists who have a divine right to this Dhammadeepa have no where else to go. The Sinhala Buddhists being a generous people have allowed other minority communities also to share this land. But they must know their place and behave accordingly. The Sinhala Buddhists are way on top of the pecking order.
The privileged position of the Sinhala people depends on a united and undivided Sri Lanka. For this a strong, centralised State under a unitary Constitution is essential. Some minorities may be concentrated in certain regions. This does not mean that they have special rights or that power needs to be devolved to the periphery. There can be no Federalism. There can be no recognition of any region as a historic habitat of the minorities. There cannot be even real Devolution. Only some de - centralisation for the sake of administrative convenience could be possible.
Rajapakse like most Sinhala Buddhist hawks does not believe that the LTTE will ever agree to anything other than Thamil Eelam. Besides Rajapakse cannot accommodate the LTTE in a settlement even if the tigers are willing to compromise. Even if the LTTE agrees to a united Sri Lanka some form of Federalism or even Confederationalism is necessary. This Rajapakse is unwilling to agree to. This is not a case of Rajapakse being flexible and the Sinhala hardliners being rigid. Mahinda and the Mahajanaya are of the same opinion. He is truly a man of his people in this.
Against this backdrop Rajapakse realises that whatever the time frame of any potential discussions with the LTTE the final outcome can only be a total breakdown. The impasse will surely lead to total war. Mahinda sees himself as the divine instrument that would lead the rightful owners of this Island to complete victory over the enemy threatening Country, Race and Religion. (Lanka, Sinhala and Buddhism)There was much talk of the great liberator “Diyasena” in 1956. Mahinda is Diyasena delayed perhaps by 50 years.
It is well - known that Mahinda is a strong Southern regionalist. Such Ruhunu Consciousness has its own baggage. There is the Dutu Gemunu syndrome where many Sons of the South think they are latter - day incarnations of Rohana. They have to protect the Country and liberate it from its enemies.
Let it not be forgotten that Mahinda never associated himself with any major effort to resolve the national question through federalism under Chandrika Kumaratunga. The excuse is that Kumaratunga ignored him. True! But then this was what Rajapakse wanted. Had Rajapakse really wanted to associate with those efforts I am sure he could have bulldozed his way in. After all when he wanted to be Premier he cut Lakshman Kadirgamar’s throat neatly. When he wanted Presidential nomination he circumvented the Bandaranaikes , did he not?
What has been apparent in the past is Mahinda’s consistency in identifying himself with the forces of Sinhala racism opposing even meagre concessions to the Tamils. There he was at the Buddhist demonstration opposing the Devolution bill in 2000. There he was visiting the fasting Omalpe Sobhitha at Dalada Maligawa. Who was the man behind the JVP action against the P- TOMS.?
Compounding matters further is the treatment meted out to Mahinda in Jaffna in the aftermath of the Tsunami.by tiger instigated mobs. Spoiled rice and excreta pots were hurled at him. Just as JR Jayewardene never forgot the slippers thrown at him in Jaffna Rajapakse also would not forget this insult. Of course Rajapakse can say he has no grudges against Tamils and prove it by saying “My Best friend is a Tamil. Its Douglas Devananda”.
Frivolity apart Rajapakse has very correctly gauged the LTTE to be the primary and effective obstacle to his political aims. He has devised a policy therefore of containing and undermining the LTTE in the short run . In the long run he hopes to launch an all out war to annihilate the tigers. Another important consideration is the IC. The active support of the IC is required to bankroll the economy while war is conducted.These are the defining parameters of Mahinda Rajapakse’s current policy towards the resolution of the National question.
Satisfying or hoodwinking the IC is of crucial importance. The idea is to pay lip- service to certain words , phrases and statements that are music to the IC’s ear. Its like chanting Manthras in a Pooja. The current key words as far as the IC is concerned is peace, talks and peace process. Other Manthras of importance are negotiated settlement, democracy, pluralism, human rights, devolution, minority rights, inclusivity etc.
The important thing to remember is that only paying lip service is required. Keep mumbling the jargon and go through the motions of peace process participation. In order to impress the IC Rajapakse would always appear to be reasonable and flexible. Take the Geneva talks for instance. Mahinda instructs his team to accept the accord. “Porunthuvelaa Enda. Passa Balamu” (Promise and Come. Lets see later).
So the Geneva agreement is signed. But within 24 hours all sorts of new interpretations are given. A fresh stance is articulated. This negates the essence of what was agreed upon in Geneva. The LTTE is humiliated at the Airport. Helicopters are not provided for internal transport thereby causing an unnecessary crisis. Making promises on the one hand in Geneva and defaulting in performance on the other in Sri Lanka is the standard adopted..
In a sense Mahinda is not being very original in this approach. The tragic history of Sinhala - Tamil relations in this Country is replete with such instances. The first Sinhala film(produced by a Tamil SM Nayagam) to be made was “Kadawuna Poronthuwa” or Broken Promise. The breakdown in Ethnic relations is characterised by a trail of broken political promises. That history continues.
So this component of the strategy is quite simple. Appear to be reasonable and flexible and above all amenable to the IC requests. Talking to the Tigers? Yes of course!. Strengthen the ceasefire? Yes Certainly!! But act entirely the opposite in practice. Thus we witness the spectacle of refusing to dismantle the high security zones, we see assassinations of Tamil activists and the blatantly transparent support extended to alternate armed Tamil groups.
While impressing the IC in this manner attempts are made to diplomatically weaken and isolate the LTTE. The most convenient label is terrorist. The LTTE is essentially a freedom movement but some of the methods it uses are “terroristic”. It is easy therefore for Colombo to get the LTTE proscribed internationally in a post - Sep 11th 2001 World. Even here the GOSL is smart. It requests international proscription of the LTTE only for two reasons. One is to pressurise the tigers into participating more actively in the peace process. The other is to protect Tamil expatriates from tiger extortionists.
What is underway carefully and systematically is a slow process through which the LTTE is being driven away into the cold. The tigers are being put in the international dog house. The purpose is long term. The isolation of the LTTE from the mainstream International Community would be of immense help to Colombo when all out war starts. A concerted transnational effort against the LTTE short of deploying actual personnel on ground could very much be on the cards.
Unfortunately the LTTE seems unable or unwilling to transform itself even as a tactic to prevent this phenomenon. It makes all the wrong noises and emits all the wrong signals thereby expediting its downfall. It appears utterly helpless in preventing or even forestalling the impending calamity. Some policies practised by the tigers in Sri Lanka and abroad have proved Counterproductive. It is now experiencing the consequences of such conduct.
Meanwhile Rajapakse is preparing for total war. Shopping lists are being sent out. Diplomatic missions are undertaken to solicit support. Not so subtle efforts are being made to exploit differences among rival nations to stimulate competition in helping Lanka’ s war effort most. Plans are afoot for conscription. A war emergency declaration suppressing press freedom and concentrating power in Rajapakse’s hands is very likely. Those who think Mahinda with the beatific grin is incapable of dictatorial tendencies are in for a nasty surprise. A Bonapartist is on the make.
If preparatory efforts are on for a total war there is overt and covert warfare of a limited nature going on at present. This is another important aspect of Rajapakse’s regime. Overtly it is described as retaliatory and confined to specific objectives. Covertly it is an undeclared, shadow war that is both provocative and retaliatory at times.
Whenever the LTTE crosses the line too much like the suicide bomber attack on Army headquarters or the marine assault on a naval convoy retaliatory strikes are openly announced and implemented. Thus we had the air, sea and land assault on Muthur. Aerial bombardment. artillery firing from Army camps and shelling from Naval gunboats was done incessantly. The second time saw Muthur getting only artillery firing and naval gunboat shelling. Nothing from the air. But Kilinochchi and Mullaitheevu districts experienced aerial bombardment.
The amazing thing about this is that Rajapakse has been able to get way with this. No International opprobrium at a policy which deliberately targets a segment of civilian population as collective punishment. Vicarious responsibility is being imposed upon a people for no fault of their own. The IC through its silence is being perceived as supportive of this. Again Rajapakse has been clever in responding this way only after a grave violation by the LTTE.
Thus the IC sees these acts as a consequence of LTTE behaviour. Both the GOSL and LTTE are guilty of violating the ceasefire and basic human rights. But the culpability of the GOSL is even higher but in a Post - Iraq scenario the Global Policeman acts dumb.
On the other hand there is the covert warfare. On one level it is retaliatory and reactive. Those responsible are Tamil groups like the EPDP and TEMVP (Karuna faction). The security personnel provide logistical support. So if and when a soldier is targeted by the LTTE or pro - tiger militia the alternative armed groups go ahead and bump off civilians suspected of having tiger links. The GOSL propaganda machinery puts the blame on the LTTE or it is attributed to internecine intra - Tamil strife. The IC praises the “Commendable restraint” of the armed forces and the “Buddhist” patience of Rajapakse.
There is also proactive and even provocative violence unleashed by the state. These are of different types and serve different goals. One result of the ceasefire has been the growing influence of the LTTE in GOSL controlled areas. This has created a potential fifth column in these areas. By targeting those supporters of the LTTE and those suspected of being connected to the tigers the people are being driven through fear into tiger controlled area. Thus a potential fifth column threat when open war erupts is being diminished.
There is also the deliberate provocative violence which targets the LTTE or tiger supporters. The deep penetration squads are actively infiltrating LTTE areas and exploding landmines. Civilian supporter Vigneswaran is shot dead in Trincomalee. LTTE senior leader Ramanan is killed in Batticaloa. Muslim groups are being armed and instigated into targeting Tamil civilian supporters of the LTTE in Muthur. Sinhala home guards and criminal elements are being encouraged to engage in anti - Tamil violence with armed forces aiding and abetting.
There are also acts of violence against civilians by armed forces. The Puthur , Nelliaddy, Allaipiddy killings. Manthuvil disappearances etc are but some of these. There are the specific acts against LTTE supporters like businesspersons, auto rickshaw drivers and barbers by Tamil paramilitary outfits like the EPDP. It is interesting to note that EPDP chief Douglas Devananda is a minister in this cabinet. The trail of responsibility goes right up to ministerial level. Not even one person has been penalised so far for any act of violence against Tamil civilians.
All these acts are not individual or random acts of violence. There is method in this mayhem. A clear design is visible. The climate of impunity afforded by the Rajapakse regime and its active encouragement is very much conducive to the violence. What is going on now is calculated state terror. Colombo newspapers spoke of a “Dog response” or “Lion response” when it came to responding to LTTE violence. Naturally the regime headed by the Ruhunu lion chose the lion response. The state terror being unleashed is the Lion response.
This does not mean that the LTTE is blameless. Of course it has to bear much blame. But there are three points to consider. Firstly tiger violence is duly recognized and roundly condemned nationally and internationally whereas the state - inspired violence is neither identified correctly or condemned deservedly. Secondly not all state violence is provoked by the LTTE. Much of it is initiated by state agencies. Thirdly the LTTE is after all “terrorist” outfit being proscribed by the IC. The GOSL is a democratically elected entity that has a greater responsibility to refrain from state terror.
These then are the parameters of Rajapakse’s policies towards the tigers and by extension the Tamils. Against this backdrop is the slow build up of a Sinhala Consensus for war. The farce that is an all party Conference passes resolutions supportive of peace and negotiations for international consumption. Outside the Conference the JVP and JHU and PNM carry on relentless campaigning for war against the LTTE which in practice would be against the Tamils.
It cannot be denied that Mahinda Rajapakse’s task has been made much easier by the LTTE. The tigers by their conduct and posturing have alienated much of international opinion. Erik Solheim rescued them several times and delayed the inevitable international backlash. The LTTE however keeps on blundering diplomatically again and again. Instead of being able to expose Mahinda Rajapakse for what he is the LTTE has succeeded in the impossible. They have managed to make even Mahinda look good in International eyes and get praised for his restraint.
If Mahinda was really keen to free himself of JVP and JHU shackles the easiest course would be to align with the UNP. But he does not do that. Instead he travels along with them. Apart from being ideologically similar Mahinda needs them to make him look moderate. Also they are building up the climate for hate and war. I think a national Government comprising the JVP , JHU and hawks among the UNP will be a reality when open war breaks out. To a man of Mahinda’s Chinthana War will be the best option to garner, consolidate and retain power.
Western media reports refer to Sri Lanka sliding or drifting towards open war. No the Country is not drifting towards war. It is already at war. The killing of more than 500 persons in a single year can be classified as war. If we take the casualty figures from Dec 2005 to May 2006 we find that the figure has been passed. What is happening now is a steady steering of the Country into total war. Both the GOSL and LTTE are doing this for their own objectives.
Both sides help each other indirectly. The targeting of security personnel makes many Sinhala people support Rajapakse. They feel firm action is necessary to combat the LTTE. The targeting of Tamil civilians by security and paramilitary groups makes many Tamil people support the LTTE. They feel only the tigers can effectively counter the state terror.
When Mahinda Rajapakse won the Presidential elections last year on a hardline platform I wrote that it was a defeat not for the tigers but for the moderate Tamils desiring to live in a united Sri Lanka with equal rights. With the rising anti - Tamil violence the moderate middle is diminishing. The International Community has also contributed to this diminution by its own blunders. The Tamil moderates are rendered totally impotent.
Both sides know that their acts help strengthen the other. But they want it because extreme polarisation on ethnic lines is what they require. Sinhala people must rally round the GOSL and Tamil people must flock to the LTTE is the credo. Sadly this is happening now. The middle ground is disappearing. Moderates are perceived as traitors. Armageddon is on the way!
Will Mahinda Rajapakse be able to achieve his objectives and usher in war? if he does so will he succeed in defeating the LTTE and re-structuring the Sri Lankan state under Majoritarian hegemony?
The answer to the first question rests primarily on the Sinhala people and the International Community. Will they go along with the hidden agenda of Rajapakse or recognize the future danger and act preemptorily?
The answer to the second lies in the LTTE. How will it transform its politico - diplomatic strategy and mobilise its military resources to combat the enemy?
Unless the Sinhala people and the International Community recognize the true colours of Rajapakse total war would be inevitable. In such an eventuality the Tamil people will be forced to support or at least not oppose the LTTE.
The war that will erupt would be a terrible, horrible one. Unimaginable destruction and death will be let loose on this Island. Whichever side wins the ultimate losers will be Sri Lanka and her people.
[transCurrents.com] Kandiah Ulaganathan known to the world as “Col” Ramanan of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was killed on Sunday May 21st. Ramanan fell victim to a sniper or hidden gunman as he was inspecting the forward defence lines (FDL’s)at Vavunatheevu in the region known as “Paduvaankarai” (Shore of the setting sun) on the west of Mattakkalappu Vaavi or Batticaloa lagoon.
Ramanan was a senior commander serving with the tigers since 1986. Rising from the ranks he has held many different positions within LTTE folds during the course of his tumultous career as freedom fighter. It was only a few weeks ago that Ramanan was made Lt. Col and nominated as deputy - military commmander of Batticaloa - Amparai LTTE by tiger supremo Velupillai Pirapakaran.
“Col’ Bhanu from Ariyalai in the North ern Province is in overall charge for Batticaloa - Amparai districts as Special Commander. Senior tiger leader Nagesh had been appointed military - commander for both districts with Ramanan as his deputy. Both Nagesh and Ramanan are sons of the Eastern soil. In addition to being deputy military commander Ramanan was also supervising the intelligence wing in the region with Keerthy running day to day affairs.
Ramanan had been on an inspection tour of LTTE positions along the lagoon shores from noon that Sunday. He was almost winding up that evening when he reached Vavunatheevu. He was chatting merrily with tiger cadres manning the frontline outposts when an accurate bullet from a sniper’s rifle smashed into his skull.
Even as Ramanan fell his body guards and other tiger cadres at the FDL’s fired away all round hoping to hit the elusive enemy. But it was of no use as the assassin was a solitary sniper lurking on top of a tree in the no man’s land between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) controlled territory and areas under tiger control. The distance between GOSL and LTTE positions was about 350 to 375 metres.
There were many trees in this space and the sniper had been concealed on the branch of one tree. The trajectory of the bullet which entered the back of Ramanan’s head suggested that say informed Tamil sources. Since Ramanan’s back was turned he would not have had the slightest inkling about what hit him.
The LTTE cadres carried Ramanan towards the interior and applied immediate first aid. Thereafter they rushed him to a nearby medical clinic. But Ramanan was no more. He had died within 15 to 20 minutes of the firing which took place around 5. 30 - 35 pm.
It was apparent from the smoothness of the operation that a cool, efficient assassin was responsible. The LTTE charged the army of being responsible. Given the sniper position’s proximity to the Vavunatheevu army camp and its forward defence lines the tiger accusation seemed valid.It seemed that some member of the special forces with excellent sniping skills was responsible.
But the renegade faction of the LTTE led by former Eastern tiger special commander Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan alias “Col” Karuna jumped in with the claim that they were responsible. The Karuna faction is called Tamil Eelam Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal (TEMVP). It has an office at Govington road in Batticaloa town. This is a house that belonged to former Batticaloa Parliamentarian Sam Thambimuthu who along with his wife Kala was killed by the LTTE in 1990.The house was later used by the Eelam Revolutionary Organization (EROS) as an office.
The TEMVP has a spokesperson called Thooyavan. Statements were released in his name that they were responsible for Ramanan’s killing. Later Thooyavan was interviewed by the BBC Tamil Service. He claimed that TEMVP cadres had launched an ambush. First a landmine was triggered and then there was firing said “Thooyavan”. Thooyavan’s answers however did not sound convincing when Ethiraj Anbarasan of “Thamizhosai” probed him about the incident.
The official stance of the Mahinda Rajapakse regime on the question of Karuna and his men is that no alternative armed groups are operating in GOSL areas. The TEMVP office in Batticaloa is a political office. So Thooyavan says that his comrades operating in tiger held areas were responsible.
But anyone familiar with the geography of the area where Ramanan was assassinated will realise that even infiltrating the place let alone operating from there is virtually impossible. This stretch of land has the lagoon one side as border. It is more agrarian with comparatively little forest cover. With the LTTE well - fortified here infiltrating the area from the interior can be ruled out.
Apart from the TEMVP claim there is no information about any landmine ambush or exchange of fire having taken place in the area. Only a lone sniper possibly with a sidekick seems to have been busy. The only way to get into the no mans land would be through the FDL’s of either side. Since the LTTE would not have done so the obvious conclusion is that it would have been from the army controlled side.
The few attacks on LTTE sentries and bunkers in this area have all been launched by persons coming from the Vavunatheevu army premises. Those responsible for such hit and run acts returned to the army camp promptly. In this case too the inescapable conclusion seems to be that the sniper came into the buffer zone from the army camp premises. It does not matter whether the actual assassin was a soldier or Karunas cadre. What matters is that he or she could not have done so without the army factor.
It is on this basis perhaps that the LTTE keeps on saying that the army was responsible despite the TEMVP jumping up like jackrabbits to claim “credit”. Another reason could be the LTTE feeling that even accusing the Karuna faction of such smooth sniping would be infra - dig.
Usually it is the LTTE that has achieved sniping credits like that of Thambirajah Subathiran alias Robert of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (Varathar faction) in Jaffna town. It is very possible that there are crack shots within the Karuna faction too.
Even if the actual sniper was not from the Karuna faction three important facts have come to light through this incident. Firstly it implicates the Vavunatheevu army camp in the killing.
Secondly the “responsibility” claim made by Thooyavan from an office within Batticaloa town demonstrates that the Karuna faction is linked to unprovoked anti - tiger violence while being in GOSL controlled areas.
Thirdly the marksman lying in wait for Ramanan to turn up shows that either there was a leak from within the LTTE or that tiger leaders had been very predictable in their routine and movements.
The killing of Ramanan would no doubt have brought much joy to his one time chief Karuna. As stated in these columns earlier Ramanan too was initially aligned to Karuna when the LTTE split occurred. Like many of the Eastern senior tigers like Ramesh, Karikalan, Prabha, Ram and others Ramanan too stood with Karuna when the latter rebelled against Kilinochchi.
It was Ramanan who was functioning as head of the Batticaloa - Amparai intelligence under Karuna when the LTTE cracked. Acting under Karunas orders Ramanan arrested a number of LTTE intelligence operatives including Keerthi who were reporting directly to Pottu Amman. They were detained at Kannankudah.
Yet in what seemed a remarkable “somersault” at that time Ramanan freed those detenues and escaped to the Wanni with them. Others like Ramesh and Karikalan followeed. Kausalyan who refused to throw in his lot with Karuna had already reached Kilinochchi.
It was the deserting of Karuna by these seniors that strengthened Prabakharans hand. It was also suspected by Karuna that Ramanan had always been loyal to Prabakharan and that he had functioned as an “agent” for Kilinochchi. This was realised by Prabakharan himself who warned Ramanan that he would be number one target for Karuna in taking revenge. This warning was given by the LTTE leader to Ramanan during a four hour conversation in 2004 during which LTTE deputy military chief “Col” Balraj was present.
There were other reasons too for Karuna and his followers to be furious with Ramanan. When the LTTE forces under “Col” Sornam launched the Good Friday counter - offensive in 2004 against Karuna Ramanan played a major role in hoodwinking Karuna faction cadres guarding the Verugal river. Some tigers pretended to be switching loyalties and crossed over.
They then turned tables on unsuspecting Karuna cadres. Thereafter others from the Trincomalee side too crossed over. Thereafter all hell was let loose. Many Karuna cadres were shot dead in cold blood and dumped in the Verugal river. Ramanan’s role in this received condemnation.
Then came the Sri Lankan defence establishment’s “betrayal” of Karuna. Soldiers manning points in Koralaipattru North division were instructed to turn a blind eye to mainstream LTTE personnel moving into GOSL areas from the North. A tiger brigade led by Ramanan was the first to enter GOSL areas and cross the Valaichenai - Polonnaruwa road. Suddenly the tigers were in Karuna’s rear. Karuna never expected this to happen . This was a crucial factor in Karuna quitting positional warfare then.
Later Ramanan was engaged in counter - intelligence activity against Karuna cadres, He even came to Colombo for a while to oversee these operations. One such act was the infamous massacre at Kottawa where eight Karuna cadres were shot in their sleep.Another inmate in the safe house had been “turned” into drugging the food surreptitiously and then calling the tigers in.
Another was the manner in which four senior tigresses including Nilavini and Laavanyaa who were loyal to Karuna were captured.in Colombo. Ramanan had abducted their close relatives in Batticaloa and then got to these girls through them They were later paraded in a press conference as having escaped from Karuna’s clutches.
Ramanan also played a prominent role in tracking down many of the LTTE cadres who quit after the split. Many youngsters were seized forcibly and transported to the Wanni.
Under these circumstances it seems obvious that Ramanan was high on the Karuna faction list for vengeance. Whichever the hand that pulled the trigger there is no denying that there is much jubiliation in the ranks of Karuna.
Ramanan or Kandiah Ulaganathan like Karuna was born in 1966. He is a native of Palugaamam. Ramanan was one of ten children. The family was agriculturist but did not own much land. Ramanan studied at the Kandumani Maha Vidyalayam in Palugamam and completed his “A” levels but did not get Varsity admission.
Ramanan’s elder brother who joined the EPRLF was the first from the family to join a militant movement. He quit the EPRLF after it began collaborating with the Indian Army in 1987. He then teamed up with the LTTE and was killed in a skirmish with the IPKF in 1988.
Ramanan was first a tiger helper during the period when Aruna was LTTE Batticaloa commander. He joined the LTTE formally in 1986 when Kumarappah was Batticaloa tiger chief.Ramanan was trained locally and not in India. He was of the third Eastern batch to be trained at the Kanchikudicharu jungle base. Ramanan started out as a cadre under the command of Reagan the tiger leader from Vellaveli.
Ramanan’s first battlefront experience was in 1987 when the LTTE engaged in fighting the Sri Lankan army at Ambilanthurai.. It was during the Indian army period that Ramanan made his mark as a group leader . He once led a successful attack on an IPKF patrol in Palugamam with the aid of a single LMG. In another attack led by Ramanan an IPKF bunker in Kokkatticholai was destroyed.
After the IPKF period Ramanan worked closely with Newton in Batticaloa and learnt many intelligence techniques from him. He also joined the first Eastern Tamil infantry division Jeyanthan Brigade Apart from minor skirmishes in the East the Jeyanthan brigade was also deployed at times in the North.
Ramanan too went along and participated in the Pooneryn - Nagathevanthurai attack in 1993 and some of the operational battles of Jayasikurui and Oyatha Alaigal between 1996 - 99. He also received specialised intelligence training under Pottu Amman during these years.
Ramanan functioned as deputy intelligence chief under Nizam for a while. After Major Nizam was killed by a deep penetration assassination squad Ramanan became acting intelligence chief. Later he was made intelligence chief on a permanent basis.
Among two prominent operations planned and supervised personally by Ramanan were the killing of former STF deputy commandant Sahabandhu and the EPRLF paramilitary group leader Razeek. There was also a time when Pottu Amman used the Batticaloa “route” to send bombs and assassins to Colombo. Ramanan was Pottu’s point man in many of these and was intensely involved along with Newton.
Ramanan had a reputation for being tough and controversial. Some of his actions proved counter- productive. Ramanan along with people like Kaushalyan was responsible for the land distribution scheme done by the LTTE in the East. Given his social background Ramanan was against the “podiar” or big land owner system.
Large tracts of land belonging to Tamil and Muslim landowners were seized and parcelled out in small allotments to poor. landless families. Fragmenting productive land along with the lack of a sustainable support system led to most new owners abandoning agriculture and the scheme failing miserably.Today most of these once fertile lands lie barren and the rice bowl of Lanka has become a dust bowl.
Another of Ramanan’s actions which caused much resentment was the destruction of nine Hindu temples in the region. These temples were owned by some feudal upper - class “Vannakkar” families. Ramanan in his zeal for social reform demolished these temples and erected other buildings in their place. In one place a fish market came up on temple premises. This caused much heartburn and finally Ramanan had to be restrained on direct orders from Pirapakaran.
Ramanan was also cruel and hard in inflicting punishment. The fate of one victim who lives to tell the tale is illuminating. This was an Eastern academic once tipped to be Vice - Chancellor of the Eastern University. He was also a close relative of a prominent journalist affiliated to the LTTE. The man was on assignment in Colombo for an International Institution when the Karuna revolt occurred.
The academic was interviewed by a reputed media organization about it. Some of the comments made pointed out that regionalism was a factor in Eastern Tamil politics. The tigers were offended. Later the academic returned to Batticaloa. He was immediately taken by the LTTE to Paduvaankarai.
Ramanan personally was in charge of “interrogation”. The man who was eminently qualified to be a future head of Batticaloa varsity was manacled and handcuffed. One method of inflicting pain was to strap both thighs together and make him walk in chains. Ramanan repeatedly told him that a decision to kill him had been taken on the day of the offensive media interview itself. It was only high - level pressure from various quarters that secured the academics release. He is now living abroad after being warned never to go public about his experience.
This then was Ramanan a man who was no respecter of human life, dignity or values when it came to his goal and mission. A sad indictment of how war and conflict brutalises and distorts values .Ramanan is not a solitary example in that respect.There are many such mirror images of him in the LTTE, Sri Lankan armed forces and paramilitary groups too.
After the Karuna revolt was contained Ramanan was made commander of the Mavadimunmarikottam zone. Then came the recent elevation as deputy - military commander for Baatticaloa - Amparai districts. Even before he could demonstrate his abilities in that command fate in the form of a sniper struck.
Ramanan was posthumously promoted as “Colonel”. He is the fourth tiger and first Easterner to be made Colonel post - humously. The first was Kittu who committed suicide at sea when the Indian navy encircled the ship he was travelling in. Then came Shankar who was killed by a deep penetration assassination squad landmine in Oddisuddan. The third was Raju who died while receiving surgery in Malaysia.
Two of Ramanan’s brothers and a sister are members of the LTTE. In the early nineties the Sri Lankan army blasted his mothers house as retaliation for an operation masterminded by Ramanan. In 2004 Karuna destroyed Ramanan’s own house as retribution for deserting him and going to Kilinochchi.
Ramanan married Vedha , a former LTTE woman militant from Mahiladitheevu.They have two children. His family was staying in Puthukkudiyiruppu in the Wanni. Ramanan’s wife assisted by the Red Cross came over to Batticaloa for the funeral.
Given the current security situation it was not possible to take Ramanan’s body to the Wanni. Special commemorative ceremonies were held in Kilinochchi and Puthukudiyiruppu with people like Col. Balraj, Col. Jeyam , Lt. Col Ramesh . Ilanthitaiyan “Marshall”, KV Balakumaran and Pottu Amman participating. [TamilNet Photo]
In Batticaloa Ramanan’s body was taken in procession and displayed for the public to pay their respects. Black flags and posters appeared. There was also a work stoppage. Yet all these were in LTTE controlled areas and not in GOSL areas.
The final farewell to Ramanan was on May 24th at Thandiyadi. Col. Bhanu, political chief Dayamohan, Womens wing leader Kuveni and TNA Parliamentarian Aiyanendran spoke at the funeral. Though many people from the tiger controlled areas were present those from GOSL areas were conspicuous by their absence. Even Independent Tamil media was not present. This was in sharp contrast to Kaushalyan’s funeral. Kandiah Ulaganathan’s body was finally laid to rest at the tiger great heroes cemetery in Thandiaddy.
One noticeable feature in all this was the absence of a public statement on Ramanan by LTTE chief Prabakharan. I did not see anything of the sort in the media. There is no doubt that Ramanan’s death is an irreparable loss to Prabakharan. His death will not go avenged. That would be the way perhaps that the tiger supremo would mourn the loss of his able lieutnenant.
In recent weeks there have been several references in local newspapers to the possible imposition by the international community of a Cyprus-style solution to our ethnic problem. I myself have had in mind the possibility of such a ‘solution’ .being imposed by India, with that country playing a role analogous to that of Turkey in Cyprus.
I first referred to this possibility about two and a half years ago in the course, of a meeting at the Centre for Society and Religion and thereafter at a meeting of the World Solidarity Forum. My statements evoked no responses at all during the discussions that followed, probably because it was thought that the possibility to which I was referring was a rather fanciful one. I did not write about it because the possibility seemed more theoretical than practical at that time. Besides, writing about it could easily provoke anti-Indian hysteria.
Today with the peace process in a shambles, and the future looking uncertain, the possibility of a Cyprus-style ‘solution’ is clearly seen as having come into the realm of the practical and is no longer merely theoretic. It is time to look at it as a worst-case hypothesis. The risk of provoking anti-Indian hysteria has to be faced.
My argument is premised on three points. The first is the contrary to all appearances India is deeply concerned and involved with the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. The second is that India will go to any extent, incurring any amount of international opprobrium, to safeguard its territorial integrity and political unity. The third point is that while the breakup of a neighbour through the rebellion of an indigenous separatist movement will set a dangerous example for India, its breakup under Indian aegis will not.
There is widespread impression in Sri Lanka that India is strangely indifferent to the possible implications for India of Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem, and even that it has been irresponsibly unmindful of the security threat posed to India by the overweening ambitions of the LTTE. This impression certainly accords with appearances, and is understandable among the general public. What is strange is that it has been shared by Sri Lankan with professional diplomatic experience, including former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. They have been vociferous on the subject and even censorious over India’s supposed irresponsibility.
My own impression is that India has one of the very best Foreign Services in the world, in which every single officer owes his position to merit and not to pull, a service which has displayed over the decades the highest standards of professionalism. To charge it with irresponsibility seems to me bizarre. It is surely otiose to ask India to be mindful of threats to its security. It is also richly comic, the minatory wagging of fingers comes from Sri Lankans whose Governments over the last fifty years and more have been among the most irresponsible in the world.
The truth very probably is that India has been indifferent to our ethnic problem only in appearance whereas in reality it has been active and active in a way helpful to Sri Lanka, from behind the scenes. The important point is that it has not wanted to play an overtly active role, for which it could have excellent reasons
The background to India seeming indifferent might probably be found in a perception that the time had not come to meaningfully reach out for a political solution. I recall a meeting at the ICES, some months after Norway assumed its facilitatory role, at which the British writer Michael Ignatieff made a presentation. During the discussion that followed he made the point that the peace process had been started prematurely. He argued that while there was war in the Northeast there was none in the South, where economic development was taking place and people went about their business peacefully. Consequently there was no sense of urgency about the need for a peaceful solution. Retrospectively it seems to me that Ignatieff was quite right.
In addition to that perception, India could have reasons of its own for believing that the peace process has been premature. One has to do with the personality of Prabhakaran. It seems useful to recall a conversation that I happened to have with an Indian official on the evening of April 19, 1995, the day on which the LTTE broke negotiations with the PA Government and unilaterally resumed hostilities. He asked me whether I was surprised, and I confessed that I was. He on the contrary was not surprised at all because of the experience he had had as an official in Rajiv Gandhi’s Secretariat, in conducting several rounds of discussions with the LTTE headed by Prabhakaran. At the end he came to the conclusion that Prabhakaran was a psychopath, and there will never be a peaceful solution to the ethnic problem as long a Prabhakaran heads the LTTE. Very probably that was, and has remained, the view of the Indian Government.
Another specifically Indian reason for regarding the peace process as premature could arise from a sense of legitimate national pride. The LTTE is certainly not the sole representative of the Tamils but it is their sole representative with credible fire power. That means that at the present stage the LTTE has to be given pride of place both in the negotiation process and in its outcome. But the present leadership of the LTTE consists of persons who were directly responsible for the Rajiv Gandhi assassination or were complicit with it. In terms of legitimate Indian national pride such persons merit public hanging, and not the award of power in Northeast Sri Lanka. India can be expected to enter the peace process without qualms of conscience only with a reconstituted LTTE or after its elimination.
There are thus excellent reasons why India should refuse to play a direct and overt role in the peace process. Underlying it all is a peculiar Sri Lankan ambivalence about foreigners. We are famously welcoming to them at a superficial level, for instance as tourists, but we greatly fear their involvement in our internal affairs, which is doubtless a heritage from the long periods of invasion and conquest to which the island has been subjected.
Today the term “international community” has negative connotations for many Sri Lankans, whereas for the rest of the world it is simply a neutral term designating the member States of the United Nations. Today many Sri Lankans in influential and powerful positions, inclusive of many in the Government, are convinced that Norway has been playing a diabolical role the peace process. It is not a perception shared by any other government in the entirety of the rest of the world. For well known historical reasons our fear is greatest about India. Its direct and overt involvement in the peace process at the present stage will prove to be a seriously counterproductive factor. Doubtless successive Indian governments have been mindful of the possibility.
I have made the point above that India has been helpful to Sri Lanka on the ethnic problem from behind the scenes, in which connection I have mainly two developments in mind. One is the Karuna rebellion, the mighty blow so far struck on the LTTE solar plexus. I find it impossible to believe that the rebellion has been sustained so far and so effectively without Indian involvement. Very probably RAW was involved in it right from the inception.
The other development is the emergence of the US as the foremost champion of Sri Lanka on the ethnic front. This should be seen in terms of international geopolitics. The US became the globe’s sole superpower after 1989 but it has been able to make its will prevail only to a derisory extent because of a lack of manpower and economic clout. It therefore needs allies, auxiliaries, clients, and the obvious choice as ally in South Asia has to be its regional great power, India. Alliances are based on reciprocity, and that meaning that the US has to be prepared to act as proxy of India to some extent.
The US can intervene in Sri Lanka with some degree of impunity where India might be loathe to do so because of a feared reaction from Tamil Nadu. I believe that this geopolitical factor, and not the US obsession about international terrorism provides the greater part of the explanation for the US emergence as Sri Lanka’s champion.
The above material should suffice to show that India so far from being indifferent to Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem, has been deeply involved with it. The reason for this arises from the second premise on which my argument is grounded, which is that India will do anything to safeguard its territorial integrity and political unity. Developments on the ethnic front in Sri Lanka can pose a threat not just to India’s security in the normal sense, but to India’s very existence.
The important point to be borne in mind here is not just that India consists of multiplicity of races, ethnic groups, languages, religions, and cultures. The important point is that many of those ethnic groups can claim all the attributes requisite for the form of nation-states. That is probably why Indian anxieties about threat to India’s unity run very deep. How deep they run is suggested by the fact that any reference to India’s possible breakup is usually taken by Indian diplomats as implying hostility towards India. Many a dignitary visiting India has been stunned by the angry reactions to any reference to the Kashmir ‘problem.’ We Sri Lankans must never underestimate India’s anxieties about its unity.
The third point on which my argument is premised is that the breakup of a neigbouring country under India will not necessarily be detrimental to India. At one time many Sri Lankans were convinced that India was all out to break up Sri Lanka and thereafter they became convinced that India would never be agreeable to the breakup of Sri Lanka because that would provide a fillip to separatist movements within India. We must remember that the breakup of Pakistan under Indian aegis in 1971 actually strengthened India.
It would be idle to speculate on the various possible exigencies that could drive India to try to impose a Cyprus-style ‘solution’ on Sri Lanka. The important point to be borne in mind is that India could come to feel driven to do that, incurring any amount of international opprobrium, if it/that its existence as a unit is at stake. [Source: DailyMirror]
“The low-intensity Eelam War IV launched by the LTTE continues”. Defence Correspondent Iqbal Athas in Situation Report ‘The Sunday Times’ 21 May 2006.
“The truce monitors in Sri Lanka will not pull out even though they are now monitoring a war rather than a ceasefire”. - The head of the Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Ulf Henricsson told the BBC interview 18 May 2006.
“The peace process had never come to terms with the LTTE’s agenda and the South failed to demonstrate a tangible will for a political settlement that would have enabled the Tamils to challenge the LTTE”. - University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) Sri Lanka - UTHR(J)- Special Report No. 21, 15 May 2006.
Nature of the conflict
The shifting war and ‘no war’ situations arose after the agitation by the politically marginalized, discriminated and intimidated Tamils (by periodical pogroms and other violent attacks) for effective self-governing powers to safeguard their collective security and interests and fulfill their aspirations was hijacked by the armed group, the LTTE. The continuing dispute between the Government and the LTTE with or without the ceasefire can be likened to the troubles within two difficult members of a family over land ownership. At the beginning, it was over the grievances of the small fellow that he was being generally ignored and occasionally ill-treated. He acquired a violent behaviour since boyhood influenced by the hostile environment and bitterness towards the big fellow, who has yet to reach the mental state of a sensible grown-up. The latter has inherent fears of losing his share, if the small fellow is given uncontrolled powers. The big fellow lacks the will to do the right thing and believes his shrewdness will enable to keep the small ‘brother’ at bay. Earlier he used violent methods to subdue the small fellow but these over time created a backlash which he is now unable to control. His cleverness too is now seen to be not comparable with the trickery and parody of the smaller guy, whose arrogance has jumped high after some degree of fighting successes that have enabled him to acquire control over a portion of the wanted land. It is this quality that is threatening his future and others around him.
He expects to be treated as an equal in all respects concerning matters related to the land dispute. At the same time he expects, as a matter of right, his opponent to provide the goods and services whenever needed by him. On an earlier occasion he even got arms for his fighting cadres. He feels not obliged to reciprocate for any assistance received. He is very sensitive to these notions and does not want the rival to behave like bossy ‘Big Brother’. Because of nonobservance of these obligations, he has refused in the past to talk with his opponent. When he is willing to talk, it will exclusively be on the subject(s) decided by him. He also objects to any retaliatory attack when he strikes the opponent hard. The objection is made in the strongest possible terms, such as genocidal attack and violations of human rights, while he violates all rights and the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) with impunity. Lately, the contest outside the fighting arena is about convincing the confused world that the opponent is the real bad guy.
Conflict resolution
Hopefully, the above portrayal of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka as an internal dispute over land ownership between two brothers with contrasting mindsets will help to understand fully the ineffectiveness of the approach pursued to resolve the protracted conflict. Since the first Eelam War, there have been talks between the Government of Sri Lanka {GoSL} and the LTTE necessitated by either internal or external circumstances. The Tamil Tigers have never said they will renounce violence and seek a settlement by peaceful means. Preparations for the next round of the war proceeded during the ceasefire periods. However, with the February 2002 CFA (also referred to as MoU) a different approach to achieve the same Eelam goal without waging war was pursued by the LTTE. But it got stuck mainly because of the overbearing demands of the Tiger leadership. The LTTE was keen on having the same status as GoSL when both were engaged in ‘Peace Talks’ and was also recognized as equal partner in the ‘peace process’.
The talks were used to acquire some political and military gains. Discussions on substantive political issues were tactfully avoided. There was no agreed agenda for the meetings. But for the Geneva Talks I, the LTTE unilaterally fixed it. The only item was disarming the ‘paramilitaries’. The rebel group that is absolutely committed to the division of the country (the earlier description of the conflict as dispute over land ownership should be noted) will dodge negotiations on issues that concern the political rights, safety, living conditions and the aspirations of the people. The main reason for the avoidance is that these are the grounds for separation. On the other hand, if the negotiations are for deciding and fixing the boundaries of the two separate states, the enthusiastic involvement of the LTTE is assured. The reaffirmation by the LTTE leader at the April 2002 international media conference in Kilinochchi of his earlier pledge not to abandon or deviate from his Tamil Eelam goal still stands. Those talking about Talks and Negotiations have either forgotten this reaffirmation or not taken it seriously.
It is here that the government is deceiving others and possibly itself by appealing to the international community to exert pressure on the LTTE for it to come to the negotiation table. The saying that you can take a horse to the pond but you cannot force it to drink the water is relevant here. In Sri Lanka’s case, the tiger pretends that it is waiting to drink soon when it is really waiting for some opportune moment to run away. Those who can recall how the previous negotiations collapsed will know the nature of this game.
The dodging game
Why and how the dodging game is played in the name of the ‘Peace Process’ are discussed here. Way back at the time of the 1985 Thimbu Talks, when India was the facilitator, the strategy of the LTTE ideologue and chief spokesman Anton Balasingham for preventing a final political settlement when seen as acceptable to Sri Lanka was ‘to put forward new demand(s) that the government will not be able to concede readily’. He is a real maestro in finding some excuse for withdrawing or even revoking earlier decisions like the December 2002 Oslo declaration. The reason for this ploy is obvious. Acceptance of a political settlement preferred by the government will become a permanent obstacle to the realization of the Eelam goal. Like the misleading term ‘Peace Process’, ‘Peace Talks’ never meant the negotiations for the real peace desired by all citizens and the international community. Only sincere {not spurious} peace will ensure the harmonious co-existence of all ethnic communities and national unity.
The LTTE strategist on the eve of EU announcement to proscribe the organization said (May 18): “Further international proscriptions of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) will seriously impact negatively on the already weakened peace process in Sri Lanka”. Asked by TamilNet for his comments to press reports that the European Union (EU) would ban the LTTE he warned that “the hardliners in the south are urgently seeking the international isolation of the LTTE as a prelude to taking up the military option in earnest. The more the international community alienates the LTTE, the more the LTTE will be compelled to tread a hardline individualist path”. The same reason that banning the LTTE will damage the ‘peace process’ advanced earlier did not deter the present Canadian government from banning it in March this year.
After the proposed EU Parliamentary Resolution (expected to be adopted by the end of this month) was released, the LTTE ideologue told the TamilNet on May 20: “The resolution of the European Union Parliament imposing punitive measures and harshly censuring our liberation organization is unfair, untimely and utterly biased. This EU intervention will thus emerge as a serious impediment to reaching a just and lasting solution to Sri Lanka’s conflict”. He also said: “The resolution, while demonizing the Tamil Tigers for the escalating violence and for the stalemate in the negotiating process, has condoned and complimented the real culprit – the Rajapakse administration – which is instrumental for the state terror and massacres of Tamil civilians that have hindered the resumption of peace talks”; and has blamed the government for “the enormous suffering inflicted on Tamil civilians, the widespread killings and massive displacements caused by aerial and artillery bombardments, the series of brutal murders by Army-backed paramilitaries”. The oddity lies in the accusations made blatantly against the government when the same offences have been committed several times by the accusing side with greater gravity.
Besides the usual exaggeration and distortion of facts intended to mislead the Tamil people, there are hidden contradictions with regard to the aims and the approach used to achieve them. First “the just and lasting solution to Sri Lanka’s conflict” cannot be achieved by dividing the people and the country along ethnic line and establishing a separate authoritarian Tamil state. Second, no honest person will deny that “the stalemate in the negotiating process” is due to the intransigence of the LTTE. Third, the sufferings of the Tamil people have not been the major concern for the Tigers. If this was the case, the LTTE leadership would have allowed the government to carry out humanitarian work during the ceasefire and especially after the devastation caused by the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. In fact, the hardships were exploited for political advantage.
A fundamental point that should not be ignored here is “just and lasting solution” cannot be achieved without Truth and Reconciliation. Both remain excluded in the so called ‘peace process’. In the first place, LTTE’s declared commitment to negotiated political settlement which should be central to genuine peace process is spurious. But the undeterred ideologue and strategist Anton Balasingham is continuing to do his propaganda work from London, despite the exposure by the critics of the many contradictory stances. In the interview given to Sunday Times (21 May 2006) he has said: ”The LTTE is seriously committed to peace and negotiated settlement”. This is also the stated position of the government. Only the fools will believe from the stated identical commitments of both sides, a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict is feasible.
The deceptive talk intended to confuse and present the LTTE as a movement fighting to win the freedom of the oppressed Tamils was seen again in the interview given to TIME Asia magazine. Anton Balasingham to the question, “What do both sides want?” replied: “The conflict is essentially an ethnic conflict having its roots in the long history of oppression and racial discrimination of the minority Tamils by successive Sinhala dominated governments. The LTTE favors a form of regional autonomy and self-government as a solution to the Tamil question. The government of President [Mahinda] Rajapakse has not yet presented a coherent policy or formula to resolve the ethnic conflict”. (TIME Asia 22 May 2006). If the North-East conflict is not about control of the land but is an ethnic problem then its resolution based on Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam’s set of devolution proposals should have been considered and suggestions submitted for constitutional change. But the LTTE considered it as an obstacle to the achievement of their separatist goal. If the bloody conflict is just an ethnic problem, why was a separate Muslim delegation not permitted to join in the ‘Peace Talks’? Why was the December 2002 Oslo Agreement to pursue a federal solution rejected? If the LTTE is willing to accept a federal structure in lieu of separation, will they decommission the weapons and immobilize their soldiers and Sea Tigers? In any federal set up, there can only be one combined defence force under one supreme commander. These are issues that no one wants to talk about hoping these will fade away in due course.
Commenting on Anton Balasingham’s misleading statement, D.B.S. Jeyaraj in TamilWeek of May 20 has said, “it strengthens the anti - LTTE accusation that the tigers are warmongers. It also sounds “funny” in a sense because the LTTE itself has been engaging in acts that amount to an undeclared war. The tigers are not in a position to be concerned about war when they themselves are promoting it in stages”.
Government’s weakness
The inability or unwillingness of the government to present a governing structure that will devolve adequate powers to the regions with the necessary safeguards to prevent discrimination of the ethnic minorities is being exploited to the maximum by Anton Balasingham. He can go on making the same challenge thrown in November last year asking the government to present a formula to solve the ethnic problem. The flippancy then became evident when the LTTE without giving reasonable time for the government to respond, started the provocative attacks in December/ January. Both sides are now experiencing the terrible consequences of the ‘low intensity’ Eelam War IV. If the government has no intention to organize the work on constitutional reform and come up with the draft proposals, the LTTE will continue to proceed with its own agenda with disastrous consequences to all, particularly to the Tamils. Their future is becoming increasingly uncertain.
Since February 2002 when the CFA was signed hurriedly, both sides were not concerned much about using the ceasefire to seek a political settlement and end all forms of violence that had caused enormous loss and misery to many families. After the failed attempt to amend the constitution in 2000 because of confrontational party politics no further move was made towards constitutional reform. The ‘Peace Talks’ was a valid excuse not to indulge in any such exercise that would undermine the ‘peace process’. It was a catch-22 situation for the government. While the government remained contended with the ‘no war’ situation, the LTTE cadres (supposed to be unarmed) with the authorization given under the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) operated freely in the government controlled areas for ‘political work’. The nature of their work was not specified and it turned out to be mainly related to gaining absolute control over the people. Political opponents were silenced by threats and some were assassinated. The recurring violent incidents have nothing to do with the ethnic problem but are the main feature of the recently emerged Tamil problem created by Tamils who depend on the power of the gun for showing their value. It used to be education and earnings but not any more.
LTTE’s past disappointments and Eelam War IV.
The inroads into civil administration have been made subtly over a long period. Senior government servants act carefully avoiding confrontation with the local rebel leaders. The foundations for an authoritarian state were being laid. The persistent attempts to use the CFA to dismantle the High Security Zones (HSZ) and limit the size of the Army confining the few remaining soldiers to their barracks located outside residential, farming and coastal areas failed. This was a major disappointment as it foiled the plan to marginalize the government in the land to be liberated.
Another unexpected development was the emergence of the dissident breakaway Karuna group as a force hindering the aim to gain exclusive control over the North-East region. LTTE’s demand that the government should disarm the ‘paramilitary’ groups must be seen from this imperative. The strategy to establish that the presence of the security forces in Tamil areas is disturbing the normal lives of the people and they are against the continued presence of the army has not succeeded so far to achieve the desired objective. Eelam War IV might have been launched with the view to breakthrough this barrier and liberate the land from occupying forces. The recent homicides where the suspects are believed to be military/navy personnel taking revenge on innocent civilians for the killings of their comrades by the Tamil Tigers, if allowed to continue will lend support to the LTTE in their efforts to convince the Tamil people they are not safe in the ‘occupied’ areas.
According to TamilNet, following the Allaipiddy (an islet off Kayts, Jaffna) assassinations and the consequent evacuation of the population, 53 families constituting 250 members have opted to seek refuge in LTTE controlled Vanni. The others are remaining in Jaffna. Furthermore, ten families from neighbouring villages Velanai and Suruvil are reported to have fled in fear seeking refuge in schools and churches in Jaffna, This kind of instant displacements and widespread panic will only serve LTTE in their propaganda war. It is widely acknowledged that the government is inefficient in challenging the facts and views spread abroad by the well-organized LTTE network in several continents to justify the continuation of the war against the State. The impression that the government is the aggressor and the Tamils are the innocent victims is spread by well orchestrated bulletins. The current near anarchic situation with various conflicting stories about the likely culprits and their motives after each murder floating is most unhelpful at the present time.
The Appendix – “The Patterns of Violence and Extra-Judicial Killings” – in UTHR(J) Special Report No. 21 gives the details concerning the recent extra-judicial killings of civilians in the North which can be considered as the fallouts of Eelam War IV. With regard to the May 13 Allaipiddy massacre, the report states: “There is little doubt that the killers are linked to the State and the killings are an instance of the growing practice of killing and terrorizing ruthlessly on the merest suspicion”. The report has pointed out that “the Navy camp is within quarter of a mile of the incident and the LTTE presence in the area is low”. It states, “we blamed the atrocities on agents of the State, which is further confirmed by the Government’s and Navy’s reactions”. Just two days earlier (May 11) Navy lost two officers and 15 sailors when an explosive laden LTTE Sea Tiger boat rammed one of the Dvora (navy gunboat) escorting the vessel ‘Pearl Cruiser’ transporting some 710 troops. The refugees who have fled Allaipiddy for rebel-held Kilinochchi town have blamed the navy for the massacre.
Appeals
The muddled situation that prevails in Sri Lanka hindering prospects for serious negotiations on issues relevant to permanent political settlement and durable peace is evident from the above analysis. Many foreign government leaders and their accredited representatives have urged both sides to start the Talks/Negotiations. If their intentions are to cool the air that became hot with the many bomb blasts and shootings, there is some purpose. But if they expect a final political settlement from the Talks, they have not grasped the uncompromising positions and the dodging tactics of the two sides. One side is obstinate with an impractical aim, while the other lacks the will to present a suitable non-unitary structure that will render the case for separation unnecessary. India has been telling Sri Lanka to come up with a credible political package and go for a “southern consensus” so that competitive populism does not kill the move as happened in 2000. This has become the standard reply to Sri Lanka’s plea for India’s input to political settlement of the conflict.
Donald Camp, the US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs during his recent visit to Delhi said, “while the international community can exert pressure on the Sri Lankan government there is little leverage the world has on the LTTE”. Unfortunately, this fact was not considered earlier. The co-chairs at the coming Tokyo meeting (May 30) are likely to press Colombo to come up with such a package soon. This seems to be the correct thing to do for the reasons given above.
The TULF leader V. Anandasangaree in his letter (6 May 2006) to the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran said: “The time has now come for you to declare a permanent ceasefire. You can’t trust your lieutenants and their subordinates any more. Most of the subordinates behave like thugs. They ill-treat our innocent people. They behave like super humans and treat the people like slaves. The people are fast losing confidence in you. The Tamil Eelam is never achievable …. Hence please declare that you are giving up your demand for separations and prepared to accept Federalism as a solution”. Like his previous petitions to the LTTE leader this too was unheeded. Many would find it difficult to accept the comment that the subordinates are acting on their own ignoring the instructions of the rebel leader.
National Anti War Front, Sri Lanka in its recent statement stated: “We demand that all parties honor the Ceasefire Agreement to the letter. We demand that the LTTE refrains from all acts of violence. We urge the Government of Sri Lanka to refrain from violence and not to encourage a culture of impunity. We urge the LTTE to transform itself into a political party and get involved in the political process. We urge you to commit yourself to a united Sri Lanka where both sides can achieve a win-win solution. We urge the LTTE to make a statement assuring minorities and other political entities full representation and democracy in the North and East. We urge the President to propose a political solution to the conflict”. Similar appeals by other civil groups urging the parties to give up violence completely and seek a mutually acceptable settlement through dialogue were ignored.
Yasushi Akashi, Japan’s special envoy to Sri Lanka who wrapped up his four-day visit on May 10 said at the media briefing in Colombo – “The LTTE should take note of international concerns …. There is a deep anxiety over escalating violence. It is important to have direct negotiations in order to see de-escalation of violence which has gone very far”. Earlier, after the meeting with President Rajapakse he told the press: “It was up to the government to take key political decisions on the peace front, and Japanese or any other nation could only help the government implementing these decisions”.
The inaction of the government to the appeals from various leaders and organizations for early action on the political front is of concern to all anxious to avoid another round of killings and mass displacements. The present government has announced that it wants a negotiated settlement and is ready for it. At the same time President Mahinda Rajapakse is not in favour of any further international involvement and he feels the conflict could be settled internally. But it is not clear how he proposes to breakthrough the present stalemate on constitutional reform. His baseless optimism instead of giving confidence gives alarming concern. The previous UNF government tried with some limited success the strategy to play for time and prevent the resumption of full-scale war but this was at the cost of foregoing development in key sectors. It has also increased the difficulties in building trust and uniting the divided communities. The high level of corruption and serious law and order problem besides the lack of development in key sectors and high unemployment are also the consequences of the resources and attention spent on the destructive war. The war has also discouraged foreign investment and aid. The 4.5 billion dollars aid pledged at the June 2003 Tokyo meeting was not fully available because of the lack of progress in settling the conflict. The co-chairs failed to recognize the fundamental weaknesses in the ‘Peace Process’ and ‘Peace Talks’. The nature of the ‘Peace Process’ was such progress towards a political settlement was out of the question. Another fundamental mistake was the assumption that the LTTE will be willing to compromise because of the foreign funds offered for reconstruction and development.
In the 2006 ‘failed-states’ index prepared by ‘The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy’ researchers, Sri Lanka is placed eighth and if the security situation does not improve, Sri Lanka is likely to score more negative marks and will figure high in the 2007 index as well. If the present government plays the waiting game, this is bound to happen. The Tamils cannot expect an end to extra-judicial killings if the war continues. No army in the world has only principled officers and soldiers, who when hammered on one side of the cheek will offer the other to the assailant. It is amazing the political leaders are not very concerned about this pathetic situation and are interested in frivolous matters.
Precarious situation for Tamils
The Tamils can no longer ignore the current realities, if they want peace and for their progeny. The expatriates should think of the future of the members of the community in Sri Lanka, especially those living in the North and East. Living in an imaginary world, with the fighting skills of the Tigers to gloat have made some blind to the distant prospect. The entire world wants to keep Sri Lanka as one country where the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims can live amicably respecting others rights and the traditional settlement patterns in the different regions. The violence directed against civilians and provocative attacks against members of security forces have been condemned by the UN, other international organizations and foreign governments. The LTTE is now considered as a terrorist organization and banned in several countries.
There seems to be growing discontent amongst the Tamils after the earlier hopes of political settlement and peace were dashed by LTTE’s determination to acquire absolute power, disregarding the dangers the methods and the goal itself posed for the future of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The people want genuine peace and the freedom to live normally without intimidation and oppression. If Eelam War IV continues even with low intensity it will hurt Tamil interests in the short and long terms. No tangible benefit for the community as a whole will accrue. As long as the struggle focuses on land and not on the rights and freedom of the people, there is little hope of a better future. There is the real risk of getting into a tight spot and lose the chance of getting the self-governing powers the Indian Constitution has bestowed to the regions. The Tamil nationalist leaders from C.N. Annadurai to M. Karunanidhi abandoned separation for good reason. The Tamils in South India have Tamil Nadu within united India and the Tamil people there have no serious problem living in this setup.
It is also important to bear in mind that international support is vital for a just settlement that will guarantee the security, equal rights and opportunities and the autonomous powers needed to safeguard the future of Tamils in Sri Lanka. In fact, both sides cannot afford to make the international community (the co-chairs and India in particular) lose interest in the resolution of the conflict. The countries that are showing interest now have also other commitments, internal and external and we cannot expect them to cling on to Sri Lanka for ever. There are many volatile countries in the world where the people are in a pathetic state much worse than the suffering people in Sri Lanka.
D. B. S. Jeyaraj in his article, ‘Remembering Rajiv on Fifteenth Death Anniversary’ has drawn attention to the losses incurred by the community with no tangible gains to assure the future well-being of the community in Sri Lanka. He has said: “After years of strife and sacrifice, the Tamil people have not achieved anything tangible. Multitudes have died or been maimed, economy is shattered, people dispersed, values brutalised, culture eroded and dwellings destroyed. Yet the Tamils have nothing. The LTTE may have built a military machine. But practically it is of no use other than to perpetuate misery and loss.” Eelam War IV that has been launched ignoring the global opposition to the continuation of violence in pursuit of a political goal that no country supports will add to the losses already incurred. Nearly 19,000 lives have been sacrificed and tens of thousands of children deprived of their education and normal life in the pursuit of a divisive goal that conflicts with the wider aim of sustainable peace, unity within and between communities and prosperity.
Should we try to get the maximum possible now by way of powers for governing the regions valuing all the sacrifices made so far or lose several more lives and get nothing substantial by way of regional autonomy, retaining only the ‘pride’ of not abandoning the Eelam goal? This is the question that should be pondered right now by all anxious Tamils.
In such a situation the vast majority of Tamils are likely to back the LTTE directly and indirectly. Even those Tamils who are not supportive of the LTTE will not oppose the tigers . Only a Tamil segment actively collaborating with the Rajapakse regime will be supportive of the GOSL.
Rajapakse was born in 1946 but he is in reality the politically quintessential child of 1956 (Panashaye Daruwo) Mahinda believes that the Sinhala Buddhists are the rightful and sole heirs to this Island. The Sinhala Buddhists who have a divine right to this Dhammadeepa have no where else to go. The Sinhala Buddhists being a generous people have allowed other minority communities also to share this land. But they must know their place and behave accordingly. The Sinhala Buddhists are way on top of the pecking order.
Given the current security situation it was not possible to take Ramanan’s body to the Wanni. Special commemorative ceremonies were held in Kilinochchi and Puthukudiyiruppu with people like Col. Balraj, Col. Jeyam , Lt. Col Ramesh . Ilanthitaiyan “Marshall”, KV Balakumaran and Pottu Amman participating. [TamilNet Photo]
Today with the peace process in a shambles, and the future looking uncertain, the possibility of a Cyprus-style ‘solution’ is clearly seen as having come into the realm of the practical and is no longer merely theoretic. It is time to look at it as a worst-case hypothesis. The risk of provoking anti-Indian hysteria has to be faced.
There is widespread impression in Sri Lanka that India is strangely indifferent to the possible implications for India of Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem, and even that it has been irresponsibly unmindful of the security threat posed to India by the overweening ambitions of the LTTE. This impression certainly accords with appearances, and is understandable among the general public. What is strange is that it has been shared by Sri Lankan with professional diplomatic experience, including former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. They have been vociferous on the subject and even censorious over India’s supposed irresponsibility.
The truth very probably is that India has been indifferent to our ethnic problem only in appearance whereas in reality it has been active and active in a way helpful to Sri Lanka, from behind the scenes. The important point is that it has not wanted to play an overtly active role, for which it could have excellent reasons
The LTTE strategist on the eve of EU announcement to proscribe the organization said (May 18): “Further international proscriptions of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) will seriously impact negatively on the already weakened peace process in Sri Lanka”. Asked by TamilNet for his comments to press reports that the European Union (EU) would ban the LTTE he warned that “the hardliners in the south are urgently seeking the international isolation of the LTTE as a prelude to taking up the military option in earnest. The more the international community alienates the LTTE, the more the LTTE will be compelled to tread a hardline individualist path”. The same reason that banning the LTTE will damage the ‘peace process’ advanced earlier did not deter the present Canadian government from banning it in March this year.
Another unexpected development was the emergence of the dissident breakaway Karuna group as a force hindering the aim to gain exclusive control over the North-East region. LTTE’s demand that the government should disarm the ‘paramilitary’ groups must be seen from this imperative. The strategy to establish that the presence of the security forces in Tamil areas is disturbing the normal lives of the people and they are against the continued presence of the army has not succeeded so far to achieve the desired objective. Eelam War IV might have been launched with the view to breakthrough this barrier and liberate the land from occupying forces. The recent homicides where the suspects are believed to be military/navy personnel taking revenge on innocent civilians for the killings of their comrades by the Tamil Tigers, if allowed to continue will lend support to the LTTE in their efforts to convince the Tamil people they are not safe in the ‘occupied’ areas.
Donald Camp, the US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs during his recent visit to Delhi said, “while the international community can exert pressure on the Sri Lankan government there is little leverage the world has on the LTTE”. Unfortunately, this fact was not considered earlier. The co-chairs at the coming Tokyo meeting (May 30) are likely to press Colombo to come up with such a package soon. This seems to be the correct thing to do for the reasons given above.
“The time has now come for you to declare a permanent ceasefire. You can’t trust your lieutenants and their subordinates any more. Most of the subordinates behave like thugs. They ill-treat our innocent people. They behave like super humans and treat the people like slaves. The people are fast losing confidence in you. The Tamil Eelam is never achievable …. Hence please declare that you are giving up your demand for separations and prepared to accept Federalism as a solution”. Like his previous petitions to the LTTE leader this too was unheeded. Many would find it difficult to accept the comment that the subordinates are acting on their own ignoring the instructions of the rebel leader.
Yasushi Akashi, Japan’s special envoy to Sri Lanka who wrapped up his four-day visit on May 10 said at the media briefing in Colombo – “The LTTE should take note of international concerns …. There is a deep anxiety over escalating violence. It is important to have direct negotiations in order to see de-escalation of violence which has gone very far”. Earlier, after the meeting with President Rajapakse he told the press: “It was up to the government to take key political decisions on the peace front, and Japanese or any other nation could only help the government implementing these decisions”.
There seems to be growing discontent amongst the Tamils after the earlier hopes of political settlement and peace were dashed by LTTE’s determination to acquire absolute power, disregarding the dangers the methods and the goal itself posed for the future of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The people want genuine peace and the freedom to live normally without intimidation and oppression. If Eelam War IV continues even with low intensity it will hurt Tamil interests in the short and long terms. No tangible benefit for the community as a whole will accrue. As long as the struggle focuses on land and not on the rights and freedom of the people, there is little hope of a better future. There is the real risk of getting into a tight spot and lose the chance of getting the self-governing powers the Indian Constitution has bestowed to the regions. The Tamil nationalist leaders from C.N. Annadurai to M. Karunanidhi abandoned separation for good reason. The Tamils in South India have Tamil Nadu within united India and the Tamil people there have no serious problem living in this setup.