tw news-features

By Dr. S. Narapalasingam

[TamilWeek.com] The many dilemmas in the peace process launched in February 2002 call for an alternative approach to conflict resolution that will focus straightaway on the core issues of the ethnic conflict. The dilemmas on one hand relate to the price of continuing the gory war with no definite prospect of swift victory but distinct possibility of further losses; and on the other to the difficulties in settling the conflict peacefully through the process of dialogue and compromise. Those suggesting that the government must continue to stick exclusively to the negotiation process have not fully grasped the distinction between the ethnic and separatist conflicts. This is essentially due to their misconception that the armed conflict is also about the denial of the legitimate rights of ethnic minorities and the disregard of their concerns and aspirations by governments controlled by the majority Sinhalese. Under the majority rule, legislative and administrative powers rest with the Sinhalese. Undoubtedly, these anomalies need to be removed for settling the ETHNIC conflict. However, the reality is the conflict between Sri Lankan government forces and the LTTE is considered by the latter as a conflict between two nations or two states. It is on this basis the LTTE has been acting since the ceasefire. There is already a separate de facto state, though its territory at present covers only a portion of the North-East region claimed by the separatists as Tamil homeland.

The LTTE is, therefore, not interested in the settlement of the ethnic conflict within unified Sri Lanka. This also explains their indifference to the core political issues that should be discussed and resolved for a final political settlement. At the same time, the leadership knows quite well that the separatist conflict cannot be settled at the negotiating table without setting aside the Eelam goal. This they are not prepared to do. If the ethnic conflict is somehow settled, the basis for separation will become weak.

Contradictory positions of main political parties with regard to the peace process have also contributed to the stalemate. Ironically, in some instances these have lent support to the rebels in moving subtly along their separatist path. The main opposition party UNP when it was holding the reins of government entered into peace talks with the LTTE 7 months after signing the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA). The LTTE was not in a hurry to start the direct talks. The government’s agenda for each of the six rounds of talks was not disclosed. Probably, there was no agenda to talk about beforehand. Even the former President was not aware of the agendas. Now on the eve of the Geneva Talks, the UNP wants to know why the present Government has so far not made a clear statement over the full agenda that they are expected to discuss at the talks. It is common knowledge that in negotiations one side cannot force its own agenda. The agenda has to be acceptable to the other side too. The LTTE, as before, is not coming for the talks as the weaker partner. When the Government unilaterally announced the dates for the CFA talks as February 15 and 16, these were rejected instantly. The LTTE spokesperson in Vanni told the media that it is not for the Government to fix the dates but the responsibility of the Norwegian facilitator/intermediary. Later the Norwegian Minister Erik Solheim in consultation with both sides announced the dates as February 22 and 23. Despite the demand from within and outside Sri Lanka for amending the CFA in order to improve its effectiveness, the LTTE has repeatedly said that it is against any changes and wants the talks to focus only on the implementation aspects of the CFA signed on 22 February 2002. The UNP must surely be aware of the possibility of LTTE withdrawing from the talks if unfavourable items are in the publicized agenda.

Donors’ misjudgment

The declaration of the Tokyo Donors’ Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka held on June 9 and 10, 2003 with inputs from 51 countries and 22 international organizations stated: “Assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace process towards fulfillment of the objectives agreed by the parties in Oslo. The Conference encourages the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to enter into discussions as early as possible on a provisional administrative structure to manage the reconstruction and development aspects of the transition process. The process would need the expeditious development of a roadmap with clear milestones indicating the path towards a mutually acceptable final political solution. With this in view, the international community intends to review and monitor the progress of the peace process closely, with particular reference to objectives and milestones including,

(a) Full compliance with the ceasefire agreement by both parties,

(b) Effective delivery mechanisms relating to development activity in the North and East,

(c) Participation of a Muslim delegation as agreed in the declaration of the fourth session of peace talks in Thailand,

(d) Parallel progress towards a final political settlement based on the principles of the Oslo Declaration,

(e) Solutions for those displaced due to the armed conflict,

(f) Effective promotion and protection of the human rights of all people,

(g) Effective inclusion of gender equity and equality in the peace building, the conflict transformation and the reconstruction process, emphasizing an equitable representation of women in political fora and at other decision-making levels,

(h) Implementation of effective measures in accordance with the UNICEF-supported Action Plan to stop underage recruitment and to facilitate the release of underage recruits and their rehabilitation and reintegration into society,

(i) Rehabilitation of former combatants and civilians in the North and East who have been disabled physically or psychologically due to the armed conflict ,

(j) Agreement by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on a phased, balanced and verifiable de-escalation, demilitarization and normalization process at an appropriate time in the context of arriving at a political settlement.”

It is not difficult for any one who is aware of the happenings in the North and East to admit not one resolution in the above list has been taken seriously and acted upon as stated. The joint declaration of 51 powerful countries and 22 international organizations was dismissed instantly by the LTTE as irrelevant. In an official statement issued from Kilinochchi, the LTTE said that the resolutions and declarations adopted by the donor community at the Tokyo conference were not acceptable and had no binding obligations on the organization. “The Colombo government with the active assistance of the facilitator and its international ‘tactical allies’ has formulated this strategic paper to superimpose its own agenda on the LTTE. This is unacceptable to us,” the LTTE statement said. The donors had assumed that the Oslo statement, as LTTE’s acceptance of a federal solution to the ethnic problem and the ensuing armed conflict. LTTE’s chief negotiator Anton Balasingham announced weeks after the Oslo meeting that there was no joint declaration binding the LTTE to seek a federal solution. The donor community has underestimated LTTE leader’s commitment to his final political goal.

LTTE’s statement rejecting the Tokyo declaration also referred to the government’s ‘provisional administrative structure within the laws of the land’, which fell far short of their call for “a draft framework for an innovative and effective politico-administrative structure”. The statement also complained: “The Prime Minister is taking cover behind the laws and constitution of Sri Lanka, which have effectively institutionalized racism against which the Tamil people have been struggling foe decades”. The Tamil Tigers expected the legally elected government to act unlawfully! The dilemma should be obvious to any knowledgeable person.

In the 2005 Heroes’ Day statement, the LTTE leader challenged President Mahinda Rajapakse to “come forward soon with a reasonable political framework that will satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people”. The dilemma here is not obvious. Given the political infighting in the south, the LTTE knows the government will not be able to produce an acceptable framework. On the other hand given the discord in the south, the present minority government has no choice but to wait for the LTTE to return to the negotiating table. Even if the LTTE for strategic reasons return, the team will not negotiate for a structure that bestows only limited governing powers to the ‘Tamil homeland’ and/or denies overriding powers to them.
Expert study on “Aid, Conflict and Peace Building”

The report*, “Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005″ released end of January hailed by analysts as a path-breaking international study on the peace process has pointed out the shortcomings in the peace process and underlined the need to understand the LTTE’s apprehensions as well as character. Authored by Jonathan Goodhand, a lecturer in the University of London, and Bart Klem, a researcher at the Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute with Dilrukshi Fonseka, Soosaipillai I. Keethaponcalan and Shonali Sardesai, the study followed the initiative of the governments of Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden besides the World Bank and The Asia Foundation.

It describes the LTTE’s stance in dealings with the Sri Lankan Government to be that of an authority of another state while striving to become a full state actor. It states: “For the LTTE, the peace process has involved a re-balancing of strategies and tactics. But it should not be seen a complete break with the past in the sense that the armed struggle continues, only with a stronger emphasis now placed on the political sphere. The ceasefire has, in some respects, solidified the de facto state and, in the eyes of the LTTE and their supporters has moved them closer toward a de jure state. On the other hand, the CFA has also thrown up new challenges to the authority and legitimacy of the LTTE.” These are: “The re-emergence of eastern regionalism, the growing radicalization of Muslims and the demands that it conform to international norms on human rights and democracy”. The rebellion of the renegade Karuna group against the mainstream LTTE is an unforeseen setback in the struggle for independent Tamil Eelam. The resistance of the Muslims to LTTE’s hegemony is not surprising given the aggressive ways they were treated during the war as well as the ceasefire periods. The methods used to acquire absolute controlling powers, have also exposed “the LTTE’s Janus-headed character and the tensions between its military and political ‘faces’. In parallel with brutal repression of internal dissent, continued re-armament and repeated ceasefire violations, there has been a new ‘offensive’ in pursuit of international and domestic legitimacy”. Thus the study has also exposed the contradictions and dilemmas of the LTTE in its approach to Tamil Eelam. To the Tigers, the means to achieve the Eelam objective are immaterial. The study also discusses the failed strategy used by the previous UNF government and the donor community to seek peace through development. This is not surprising because peace and development are not LTTE’s prime concern in their struggle for liberating the homeland.

The study has found: “Under the guise of a ceasefire, the permissive conditions have been created for pervasive human rights abuses and criminality… The credibility of the ceasefire agreement and its monitors has become increasingly tenuous, as the number and intensity of the violations increase…” Moreover, the study recognizes the fact that “the UNF government’s policy of LTTE accommodation in many respects sent a signal to the international community to go easy on human rights issues”. According to the authors, the perception that the international community would overlook human rights issues in the interest of sustaining the peace process and avert another round of full-scale war, “played a role in undermining the credibility of the UNF government in the eyes of India and the southern electorate.” The comment that there may be a need “to consider extending the scope of the CFA to cover the full range of military actors and to strengthen its human rights component,” is relevant to the Geneva talks on the CFA.

Since the peace process was considered by the two main protagonists as the extension of the CFA between them, the peace talks too focused on matters pertaining to the creation of conditions favourable for achieving their separate objectives. In this regard the following comment is significant. “It was perceived by many that the strategy of the two sides, with Norwegian support was to forge an elite peace, ‘behind the backs’ of other stakeholders and the wider population. Because there was no ‘road map’ for peace talks, the nature of the end goal was always unclear, which created anxieties among external and internal stakeholders”. Actually the then government’s objective was to create conditions that will compel the LTTE to give up its Eelam goal, which along with LTTE’s moves to strengthen its dominance in the North-East have resulted in Tamils sacrificing their “basic rights like freedom of speech and freedom of assembly”. The donors by now should have realized aid alone matters little in conflict resolution in Sri Lanka, particularly when the conflict sought to be resolved is not about uneven development patterns, discrimination in education and employment and marginalization of minority ethnic groups under the majoritarian regime but as mentioned at the outset between two states, one presently a de facto state that is striving to become a de jure state. The ‘no war-no peace’ situation helped the LTTE initially in their aim to gain legitimacy but this became difficult later, especially after the violent campaign intensified. Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar was a high-profile victim. The repercussion of this event has been too costly to the LTTE.
US Congress

Frank Pallone Jr, the Congressman from New Jersey introduced on February 10 a resolution in the US House of Representatives urging the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to engage positively in the forthcoming (February 22 and 23) talks in Geneva. He is the founder and co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Sri Lanka. The resolution was meant “to convey internationally the importance Congress places on continuing a constructive peace process in Sri Lanka, Asia’s oldest democracy, and to encourage both parties to cooperate fully in order to find a fair and lasting resolution to Sri Lanka’s armed conflict”. The Congressman in his speech said: “It is important that the US continue to reject the actions and violent tactics of the Tamil Tigers and apply international pressure to request that they begin conducting the talks in a responsible and credible manner”. He also said: “Despite the two parties’ recent pledge to continue peace talks later this month in Geneva, Switzerland, the resumption of armed conflict in Sri Lanka still remains a real threat”. Recent developments give credence to the predictive comment.

The resolution passed by the US House of Representatives also urged that the Ceasefire Agreement be renegotiated in order to implement a productive agreement focusing on peace and security in Sri Lanka. This is unlikely. The resolution is as follows:

“…… the House of Representatives urges, in the strongest possible terms, the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to

(1) engage positively in the forthcoming peace talks and to prevent a return to armed conflict in Sri Lanka;

(2) renegotiate a cease-fire agreement and implement the agreement in a productive and successful manner; and

(3) focus on rebuilding a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for Sri Lanka.

Apparently, the US Congressmen know the dilemmas in the peace process but believe these could be overcome by vigorous international pressure. Sri Lankan Navy has said that it has intercepted trawlers carrying detonators and explosives for the LTTE less than a month before the start of Geneva Talks. Time will only tell whether international pressure on both parties to the Agreement will succeed.

In the past the international pressure and warnings had produced only limited effect not effective enough for the LTTE to renounce violence in both words and deeds, accept pluralism and democracy, respect human rights and negotiate earnestly for a reasonable political solution that does not endanger the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. It had also failed to compel the government to come forward with proposals to settle the ETHNIC conflict (the emphasis to be noted) or even implement speedily the declared policies and approved legislations intended to address the grievances of Tamil and Muslim communities.

Hindustan Times on February 12 reported that the Chairman of the Official Languages Commission, Raja Collure has mentioned in conversation with its Colombo correspondent: “Successive governments have failed to implement the constitutional provision in regard to the use of Tamil as the second official language. This is regrettable especially in view of the fact that Tamil had been made the second official language of the country, through the 13th amendment, 18 years ago, following the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987. The HT report gave the following statistics with regard to the anomaly:

The Tamil-speaking population in Sri Lanka comprises Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Origin Tamils and Muslims. Together they are 26 per cent of the island’s population. But in the 900,000-strong public service, Tamil-speakers are just 8.3 per cent. The rest are Sinhala-speakers. Out of the 36,031 employees in the Police Department, 231 are Tamils and 246 are Muslims. Since Sri Lankan Muslims are also Tamil speaking, the total number of Tamil speakers in this vital department is just 477. Wellawatte, a suburb of Colombo, is an overwhelmingly Tamil area, with 21,417 of its residents out of a total population of 29,302, being Tamil speaking. But in the Wellawatte police station, out of the 156 personnel, only 6 are Tamil speaking. The Sri Lankan armed forces are also almost completely Sinhala or Sinhala speaking. The few Tamil-speaking personnel there are Muslims, rather than Tamils as such. There is such a shortage of Tamil-speaking senior and competent officers that in the predominantly Tamil-speaking North Eastern districts, officers are asked to stay on after retirement. There are only 166 official translators in Sri Lanka. And out of these, only 58 are Tamil-speaking.

There are many other areas where the Sri Lankan government can act to give meaning to the declared intention of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the country. The stark fact is that successive governments by their deliberate acts of commission and omission have contributed to the claim for division of the small country. The Equal Opportunity Bill initiated by the former President Chandrika Kumaratunga was considered undesirable by other Sinhalese politicians. The insensitivity of governments has contributed immensely to the disunity, turmoil and underdevelopment in Sri Lanka.

Latest confrontation

President Rajapakse in an interview with Reuters on February 13 said that he wants to solve the conflict within a unitary state rather than a federal one, and said he is looking at the United Kingdom’s model of government and devolution. “This is a small country, where you can’t have two states. I won’t allow the country to be divided,” he said. He added: “You have to give up the concept of having two nations, or two countries … There is no Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. There cannot be an Eelam …. They can have a police force, yes, but there cannot be two armies, two air forces, two navies.” This is a direct challenge to the separatists which will give them the incentive to continue the conflict delaying further the recovery process. There will be considerable international support for Sri Lanka, if a federal or quasi federal rather than a unitary structure is considered for resolving the ethnic conflict. The situation in the UK is different. In Sri Lanka, because of more than half a century of bitter experience with the unitary system the Tamils have no more faith in it, regardless of the extent of powers that will be devolved. Can the de facto state of the LTTE be integrated back into unitary Sri Lanka by negotiating with them? Will there be international pressure to retain the unitary system when a system based on a suitable federal model is the widely recommended one? By overemphasizing the unitary system, the Government is moving further away the peace goal.

The LTTE political wing issued a press statement on February 15, rejecting out rightly President Rajapakse’s observations in the Reuters’ interview. There was also a veiled threat to resume the war for self-rule. It said: “Homeland, nationhood and self-rule are the three basic and cardinal principles that have been guiding the LTTE in its struggle to find a peacefully negotiated political arrangement to the Tamil people, resolving the racial conflict. …. The Sinhala rulers are in a dream-psychosis that makes them wrongly perceive that their success in rejecting the Tamil homeland concept would invariably nullify the concepts of Tamil nationhood and self-rule. …. A resolution of the Tamil national problem through devolution of power within the parameters of the unitary constitution is a concept that has lost its credibility and adaptability almost fifty years ago. The Tamil people opted for a separate state only because their call for resolution of their national problem on the basis of federation was rejected. Tamil call for federalism has seen the passage of fifty years and their option for secession dates back to thirty years. Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse now goes half a century backwards and is taking shelter into a rotten unitary constitutional concept. Going the extra mile, he even wishes to place this concept before the LTTE that has under its de-facto administration major parts of the Tamil homeland”. It is puzzling what made President Rajapakse to raise such controversial matters on the eve of Geneva Talks.

Indian factor

Both Sri Lanka and India were responsible for the emergence of the LTTE as a potent force strong enough to challenge the authority of the national government and ignore the advice and warnings of powerful foreign governments and international organizations. India is dead against the establishment of a separate state in the Indian sub-continent as envisioned by the LTTE. India is also against majoritarian rule that unduly favours the majority Sinhalese. However, India wants Sri Lanka to settle the conflict by negotiating with the diehard LTTE and has no qualms with Norway’s role as a peace facilitator or even with the intimidation of the United States intended to avert resumption of the full-scale war but has opted not to play any direct role in the peace process. India’s dilemmas are quite different arising largely from her bitter experience when she tried to enforce peace in North-East Sri Lanka by sending the Indian army as Peace Keeping Force and the revulsion at LTTE’s role in the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The horrid killing of illustrious Indian leader (grandson of the first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru) on Indian soil led to the proscription of the Tamil liberation movement. The ban still remains in force.

President Mahinda Rajapakse soon after taking control of the reins of the Presidency visited India as guest of the Indian government. He had meetings with the President, Prime Minister and other top leaders December last year. This was also his first overseas call as head of state. There was high expectation in Sri Lanka, particularly in the South of a possible change in India’s policy of non-direct involvement in the resolution of the armed conflict.

Many Sri Lankans hoped that India would at least join the four international co-chairs watching the Sri Lankan peace process - the United States, the European Union, Japan and Norway. India’s intent not to change her stand was clear from the joint statement issued in New Delhi at the end of the formal talks. This was consistent with the pre-visit prediction of a LTTE ideologue in Vanni. Referring to the expected final settlement of the conflict in Sri Lanka, the joint statement avoided any reference to the word unitary notwithstanding President Rajapakse’s fervor for it. It said: “The President of Sri Lanka briefed the Indian leadership on his approach to the peace process to achieve maximum devolution which preserves the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The two sides agreed that an enduring solution can emerge only through internal political processes that promote consensus and reconciliation. India reiterated its support for a process of seeking a negotiated political settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights. India continues to maintain an abiding interest in the security of Sri Lanka and remains committed to her unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Indian side expressed the hope that a political settlement of the ethnic issue based on devolution, openness, transparency and inclusivity would emerge through negotiations between the parties concerned, so as to ensure a peaceful and bright future for all Sri Lankans in an undivided and democratic Sri Lanka.”

Indian analysts have interpreted the above as an acknowledgment of the need for federalism as a solution. The recognition that “an enduring solution can emerge only through internal political processes” has the message that India has no intention of getting directly involved in the peace process. This is not the first time India has announced the kind of settlement she desires, the same words and phrases used here have been repeated several times before like a mantra. But what is puzzling is the approach suggested to settle the ethnic/separatist conflict. If what is meant by “negotiations between parties concerned” refer to the Government and the LTTE which is the case if the main issue is separation, then India should know from her experience in Kashmir this cannot be settled by mutual agreement. On the other hand the word ‘inclusivity’ makes sense if the aim is the resolution of the ethnic conflict. But in this case the LTTE will not agree to join the talks merely as another internal stakeholder along with other parties. India as a major external stakeholder cannot afford to keep aloof for ever without risking her interest.

The LTTE is depending on the support of the Tamil nationalistic parties in Tamil Nadu which are currently partners in the multi-party coalition government in New Delhi. The LTTE’s ideologue, KV Balakumaran, in an interview given on the eve of President Rajapakse’s visit to India said, with the growing importance of regionalism in India, and the increasing clout of regional parties in the central cabinet of ministers in New Delhi, the Government of India will have to listen to them. Some (Sri Lankan) Tamils were inclined to think that they would not be able to achieve their objectives unless they kowtowed to India, but these people were wrong because their fears were based on an “exaggerated” notion of India’s power, he said.

“The Indian government is not like what we think. Today, it is not as strong as it was before,” he asserted. Recent Indian governments had been made up of many parties and many of these were regional parties, voicing regional sentiments, he pointed out. He said that the government of India would take note of the warning of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) leader Vaiko, that Tamil Nadu could become a “Kashmir” if New Delhi acted against the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Vaiko’s support to the LTTE is well known and there is no need to discuss it in detail.

TamilNet on January 7 reported that Dr. Ramdoss leader of Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) told Sri Lanka’s Leader of Upcountry People’s Front (UPF), P. Chandrasekaran, “while the Tamil National struggle in Sri Lanka has assumed new dimensions in its progress towards its goal, parties in Tamil Nadu are spiritually bound to provide unflinching support to Eelam Tamils. We are mobilizing our supporters in India to show our strength and unequivocally express our support”.

An interesting analysis of the possible outcomes of the visible support extended by some politicians in Tamil Nadu to the LTTE that is fighting for a separate Tamil state is worth mentioning here. Many Sinhalese have long held the view that Tamil Nadu is a threat to the island and on this false premise Sinhalese politicians successfully secured the votes of the Sinhalese masses in the general elections. And this also contributed to keep the minority Tamils politically weak. The Sri Lankan Tamils cannot risk complicating the ethnic problem further by banking on the support of regional Tamil political parties such as the DMK, the MDMK and the PMK. Even the present Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu Ms Jayalalitha whose party the AIDMK does not support the LTTE chose to cancel an appointment with President Mahinda Rajapakse when he toured India. The forthcoming elections in Tamil Nadu must have also influenced her decision. The pro-LTTE parties that are partners in the present coalition government have successfully lobbied to withhold the proposed Indo Lanka Defence Agreement. There is also the perception that the support for LTTE’s armed struggle for Tamil Eelam is motivated by the power struggle in Tamil Nadu. There is, however, the key question regarding the possible consequences of their support for the armed struggle for separation, a goal rejected by India and the international community. Do the supporters in Tamil Nadu want to prolong the suffering and misery of the Tamils in Sri Lanka by extending unqualified support for the separatist struggle? It will be fruitful, if they can influence their associates to accept a federal system.

However, the support of Tamil Nadu will certainly increase if no political solution is forthcoming from the Sri Lankan Government. The latest confrontation between the Sri Lankan President and the LTTE mentioned earlier will definitely enhance the support for the LTTE. The Tamil Nadu factor should not be ignored by the Sri Lankan government. Tamil Nadu cannot oppose the proposal for a political settlement, if the set of powers to be devolved are similar to that of its state. If Tamil Nadu rejects a devolution package acceptable to the Union Government, this will stir up tension between the centre and the region which will not be in the interest of Tamil Nadu or India.

With the internationalization of the peace process and the special interest of United States in the peaceful resolution of the conflict(s) in Sri Lanka, there is now an opportunity for Sri Lanka to settle her twin conflicts as desired by all peace loving citizens and the international community within united Sri Lanka. Without further delay, the work on preparing a suitable political framework for devolving powers should begin in earnest in consultation with all parties committed to permanent peace, minority rights, ethnic harmony and national unity. The concerns and rights of Tamils and Muslims as well as the causes of the conflict must be given due consideration. This can be assured by obtaining expert assistance. This time the exercise should not be along the lines followed in preparing the 1972 and 1978 constitutions. It was mainly the effort of politicians. Although a new constitution to replace the 1978 constitution was recognized more than a decade ago, because of some attraction to party leaders it is enduring. The direct approach is the way to avoid getting stuck again in the dilemmas discussed above. Arguments and threats will not bring peace to the country that has remained peaceful until the emergence of chauvinistic forces after independence. The people who have suffered for more than two decades and the country cannot afford to incur further suffering and losses and forego economic growth and development in crucial areas.
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• Joint project of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Agency, The Asia Foundation, Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and World Bank.

Published by The Asia Foundation, Rajakeeya Mawatha, Colombo 7, Sri Lanka. www.asiafoundation.org

By: Dr. Rajasingham Narendran

“Blessed are the peacemakers”- The Bible

[TamilWeek.com] The ceasefire agreement (CFA) signed between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) in February’2002 will be the subject of discussions in Geneva in the third week of February. The LTTE has re-iterated that it will not brook any discussions on changes to the CFA and on subjects beyond it. It is interested in only discussing the so-called Tamil paramilitary groups operating under government protection or sponsorship and the issue of the high security zones occupied by the Sri Lankan armed forces. The GOSL is seeking a wider ranging review of the CFA, possible changes to it and talks on possible permanent solutions. The international community and the United States in particular have called for a complete revision of the CFA and expressed a preference for extensive devolution of power to the Tamils. Mahinda Rajapakse, the new President of Sri Lanka, has in a recent interview said that he is ready to devolve power under the present unitary constitution and indicated his interest in how power was devolved by Britain to Scotland and Wales. The Indian constitution that was touted by Mahinda Rajapakse and the JVP-JHU combine as a possible model for Sri Lanka to devolve power to the Tamils prior to the president’s visit to India has been quitely shelved now, for reasons that could be easily guessed- the devolution in India is far more extensive than the Sinhala governments are prepared to concede in Sri Lanka. The federal model of devolution accepted by the government of former president Chandrika Kumaratunge and the opposition leader Ranil Wickramasinghe as a possible solution has been relegated to the annals of history. The apparent lack of coherence, consistency and continuity in the policies of the GOSL is a political ploy to continue engaging in petty semantics and delay permanent solutions. The lack of progress towards substantive discussions on permanent solutions over the past four years is a subject of much concern to the Tamil people.

The recent Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) report on the violations of the CFR by both parties to the agreement and the much higher percentage of proven violations (95.5%) attributed to the LTTE should be a matter of concern to the Tamils in particular. While the SLMM attributes a majority of the LTTE violations (51.7%) to recruitment of children (also confirmed by the UNICEF), other violations such as the harassment and kidnapping of civilians and, extortion committed by the LTTE have not been reported to the SLMM. What has been reported is very likely to be the tip of an iceberg, while the large mass of violations is not in the public domain. The CFA is an agreement that had to be operated in a spirit of honesty and good intentions, more than in the letter, as envisaged in the preamble. Both sides have violated the spirit of the CFA, the LTTE more so, contrary to early expectations of the long-suffering Tamils. The LTTE, as an organization claiming to be the sole representative of the Tamil people, who have borne the brunt of the evil machinations of the GOSL and the brutality of the civil war, bore a greater responsibility to ensure that the CFA was implemented fully in both letter and spirit. It has not only failed to do so, but has blatantly and unconscionably exploited and violated it. This has provided the government and its armed forces the excuse to explain away their omissions and commissions.

The preamble to the CFR has listed the following objectives:

1. To find a negotiated solution to the on-going ethnic conflict.

2. Establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards a lasting solution can be taken.

3. Provide security to civilians and their property (applies to all inhabitants of the Island, including the Muslims).

4. Refrain from conduct that would undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of the agreement.

How far have these objectives been furthered? No sustained and meaningful attempt has been made to find a negotiated settlement. The LTTE has refused to participate in any meetings since early 2004. The GOSL had also failed to implement several preliminary agreements reached with the LTTE at the six meetings held in the two years following the CFA. The LTTE submitted the ‘Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)’ proposals in response to the meaningless interim proposals made by the GOSL. These were seen by many, both Tamils and Sinhalese, as an attempt by the LTTE to pave the way to an independent state of Tamil Ealam. These proposals were also an attempt by the LTTE to legalize and perpetuate its rule in the Northern and Eastern provinces, and thwart democratic pluralism. The ISGA proposals yet considered to be on the table by the LTTE, are long dead, though not buried. The agreement on handling Tsunami related aid, relief and re-building operations, which would have gone a long way towards establishing a positive atmosphere, became non-operative following a Supreme Court decision. The growing distrust in the LTTE and its glaring venality, paved the way for the resistance to the Tsunami agreement and its subsequent abandonment. The role played by both the JVP and the JHU on this issue were distasteful, disgraceful, visionless, unpardonable and amounted political expediency of the worst kind.

The security of civilians and property as envisaged in the preamble to the CFA has not been assured at all. The on-going cold war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces since the CFA, which led to the Karuna rebellion within the LTTE and break away of the Karuna- led faction in the East has progressively escalated and became an overt war in November-December’2005. The Tamils have borne the brunt of this cold war, while both the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE have lost senior operatives. The members of the so-called Tamil paramilitary groups, suspected to be affiliated to the Sri Lankan armed forces, have been the targets of the LTTE killing squads, regardless of whether they were active in their organizations or not and armed or not. The cowardly assassination of foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, was the best-known incident in the LTTE killing spree. The Tamils have been subject to coercive illegal taxation, extortion, kidnapping, torture and other illegal measures by the LTTE, with increasing regularity and absolute impunity since the CFA, in contravention of article 2:1 of the CFA. Government employees and teachers in government run schools were also forced to follow LTTE directives under the threat of death, contravening the rules and procedures followed elsewhere in Sri Lanka. These were also serious violations of the accepted norms of human rights. Article 2.1 of the CFA states that, “The parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment”. The fear instilled by the LTTE has left the Tamils- resident and expatriate alike, helpless and with no recourse to due process and justice. The Sri Lankan armed forces have been largely above board, if not exemplary in this matter, until forced to retaliate by the overt violence initiated by the LTTE towards the end of 2005.

The attempts to establish the instruments and trappings of a functional independent government in the Vanni by the LTTE does not fall within the objectives of the CFA , which emphasizes a negotiated solution in its preamble, everyone understood to be within a sovereign, united Sri Lanka. Article 1.3 of the CFA explicitly states that the, “ Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE”. The Sri Lankan armed forces are prevented from pursuing offensive operations while being called upon to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. This is the most ridiculous clause in the CFA and has been unscrupulously taken advantage of by the LTTE, in its single-minded pursuit of Tamil Ealam. I wonder whether the GOSL expected the armed forces to engage in political activities and non-violent resistance (Satyagraha) to counter LTTE threats to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, during the operative phase of the CFA!

The institutionalization of immigration and customs protocols by the LTTE at the various crossing points (from government controlled to the LTTE controlled areas and vice-versa), which were established under the CFA with mutual security considerations in mind, are also a serious violation and are not sanctioned even implicitly there in. According to article 2.5,” The parties shall review security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population”. The LTTE checkpoints have assumed the role of international borders and have become points for civilian harassment. These check points also do not ‘Facilitate the flow of goods and movement of civilians’ as envisaged in article 2.7 of the CFA, but do the opposite. The CFA has been without doubt subverted by the LTTE to impede the flow of goods and movement of civilians, subject civilians to harassment, duress and illegal taxation and, as a launching pad to further its long-term objective of an independent Tamil Ealam.

Article 1.7 of the CFA also states that, “The parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other party”. It also permitted, “All unarmed LTTE members freedom of movement in the North and East” to principally carry out political work. The recent events in the North have clearly shown that explosives and military equipment were moved into government controlled areas by the LTTE and in the name of political work, civilians of its choice were armed to carry out acts of war against the GOSL armed forces and violence against Tamils labeled traitors. In the name of political work tax collection and extortion activities were carried out and offices were established for these purposes in government-controlled areas. Civilians in the government-controlled areas were also given weapons and explosives handling training in areas under its control by the LTTE. These acts were serious acts of violations of the CFA by the LTTE. While the Sri Lankan armed forces have also engaged in covert activities against the LTTE, they were subtler and largely enacted through Tamil paramilitaries. However, during most of the period the CFA has been in operation Tamil civilians have been dealt with reasonably well by the GOSL armed forces. The Tamil paramilitary forces working against it are a cause for complaints by the LTTE and are a major topic for discussions at Geneva. The LTTE grouse while legitimate is absolutely hypocritical, as it has been to my knowledge the bigger offender.

Article 1.8 of the CFA required that,” Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL—-“. These paramilitary groups have continued to operate at low key and have targeted the LTTE and its supporters occasionally, until towards the middle of 2005 when the LTTE and its supporters were actively pursued. The unarmed and inactive cadres of these Tamil paramilitary groups have been also hunted down relentlessly and mercilessly by the LTTE throughout the post-CFA period. The emergence of the Karuna faction following internal turmoil in the LTTE in the post-CFA period and the tacit support lent to it by the GOSL has been a thorn in the flesh for the LTTE with serious implications for its future. While the Karuna faction technically does not come under the definition of paramilitary groups alluded to in the CFA, because it was spun off the LTTE in the post-CFA period, yet in reality it is one. The weakness of the CFA lies in its failure to define and identify the paramilitary groups referred to. In 2005 these paramilitary forces have become increasingly active in the North and East, obviously under the protection of the GOSL armed forces, in response to the manner in which the LTTE was openly flouting the CFA. The Tamils living in these areas were caught in a vise as a result. The Tamil militancy has historically had a multitude of militant groups operating under various names centered on the words Ealam and liberation, with the LTTE being one amongst them, although stronger. The LTTE has also opportunistically aligned with the Sri Lankan armed forces, when it suited its designs. It yet utilizes the services of the Sri Lankan armed forces, when it suits its purposes. The various paramilitary Pongum Thamilar groups (Boiling/erupting Tamils), Ellalan Padai (Armed force), Sangiliyan Padai, etc., set up by the LTTE in the North and East and armed by them are also in contravention of the spirit of the CFA.

The question of the so-called Tamil paramilitaries is the first and the foremost that the LTTE wants to discuss in Geneva, as these groups pose a serious threat to its claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people and its imperious reign. It is a topic that is bound to be controversial and very likely be the subject of an outwardly opportunistic and unfair decision by the GOSL in order to appease LTTE. In all likelihood the GOSL will restrain these groups, but as in the past will keep these groups in reserve to be let loose (hounds of war) when necessary, as has happened in the latter half of 2005. Expediency and appeasement now can lead to grave results down the road, both to the Tamils and Sri Lanka in general. The so-called paramilitaries should not become the hunted under cover of the CFA, as the LTTE does not permit legitimate political activities by the disarmed cadres of these groups and guarantee their safety. If the LTTE would guarantee these and also disarms the paramilitary forces created by it, the GOSL is duty bound to sever its links with the paramilitary groups in its pay.

Article 1.10 of the CFA states that, “Unarmed GOSL troops shall as of D-day + 60 days, be permitted unlimited passage between Jaffna and Vavuniya using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9)”. Article 1.11 states that, “Individuals combatants shall be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other party—– and the LTTE shall facilitate the use of the Jaffna –Kandy road for this purpose and that the parties reserve the right to deny entry to specific military areas”. The GOSL armed forces, to the best of my knowledge, have not exercised these rights under the provisions of the CFA and have in the process undermined the reciprocity built into the CFA, and paved the way for the LTTE to consider areas under its control an ‘Almost’ sovereign state.

The continuation of the high security zones proclaimed by the GOSL armed forces in the pre-CFA period, with considerable hardship to the residents of these zones and resulting in the forced displacement of large numbers of people, remains another grievance of the LTTE and will be the second major topic that it wants to discuss in Geneva. Given the history and nature of the LTTE, it will be foolish to assume that this grievance is altruistic. While the hardship caused to the people as a result of extensive areas being declared high security zones by the GOSL is a cause for concern and is a major human rights violation, the LTTE interest in this matter centers around its pursuit of an independent Tamil Ealam and the desire to drive out the GOSL forces out of particularly the Jaffna peninsula as a prelude to that goal. Article 2.2 of the CFA states, “—–places of worship which are situated in their respective’ High security zones’ shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public”. How far this article of the CFA has been implemented should be investigated. However, there is no provision in the CFA to vacate the high security zones established by either party in the pre-CFA period. GOSL armed forces have proclaimed several new areas high security zones in the post- CFA period. Article 1.11 which permits either party to deny right of access to specified military areas, may be construed to permit this. The LTTE too may have done so in areas under its control. However, the system operative in the LTTE controlled areas make it extremely difficult to identify the high security zones established there; and given the lack of interest in the GOSL of the plight of the Tamils in general and those living in the LTTE controlled areas in particular, this aspect of the issue will not be taken up for discussions in Geneva.

Article 1.2 of the CFA states that, “Neither Party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to such acts as:

1. The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities of deep penetration units;

2. Aerial bombardment;

3. Offensive naval operations”.

With the exception of aerial bombardment by the GOSL air force, all other offensive activities have been carried out by both parties to some extent or other during most of the post-CFA period and with increasing intensity and frequency towards the end of 2005. The LTTE has also organized a fledgling air force during the ceasefire period and is threatening to use it in the event of a new outbreak of war, which it has been actively fomenting. There is no doubt that once again the LTTE is the major offender, despite its routine and unbelievable denials. This has given cause and justification for the negative GOSL responses. During the ceasefire period, LTTE cadres have penetrated even Colombo and other Southern cities to carry out missions against the GOSL forces and other targets, mostly Tamils, considered traitors.

The GOSL has no doubt tried to use the ceasefire period as an opportunity to undermine the Tamil demand for greater autonomy and extensive devolution. The hunger for peace amongst the vast majority of the Tamils and their disappointment with the LTTE and its ways, were misconstrued by the GOSL as an opportunity to further delay solutions to their problems. The LTTE in pursuit of its self-interest and other objectives that have little to do with the Tamil grievances has also exploited the predilections of the GOSL, at the expense of the Tamil people. Both the GOSL and the LTTE have failed the Tamil people and the GOSL has in addition failed all the other peoples of Sri Lanka. The CFA has exposed the true face of the LTTE to the majority- mostly silent, of the Tamil people and the world at large. GOSL has also been exposed to the Tamil people and the world, for its lack of interest in resolving a long-standing and debilitating problem in a just, fair and humane manner. Words such as homeland, self determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unitary and federal have been made bones of contention by both parties and the larger objective of resolving a problem that has lingered on for fifty or more years and has blighted the Tamil people in a manner that defies all civilized norms has been conveniently relegated to the background. The Geneva meetings will not address the issues that are of concern to the Tamil people, but will be centered on the problems of the LTTE and the GOSL. In all likelihood the problems of the Tamils will linger unaddressed for fifty more years, and the Tamils subjected to the worst imaginable as a people, until they become non-entities in Sri Lanka. A sad plight indeed for a once proud people, with a history that is lost in the mists of time! It is also a sad indictment of the civilized world and its many institutions that profess to champion the cause of helpless and hapless peoples.

I hope more voices will be raised around the world to focus attention on the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and on seeking permanent solutions to their problems. These voices should be heard loud and clear at the time of the forthcoming meetings in Geneva and thereafter. The Tamils cannot any longer delegate the fight for their birthrights to any political party or militant group and have to come forward to struggle for their rights from the front, through every democratic tool available at their disposal. They should demand that the SLMM be given more powers to enforce the ceasefire agreement and to protect them from the high handedness of the LTTE and the shenanigans of the GOSL. The international community should come forward to help us achieve a permanent peace as soon as possible, within the context of a united and sovereign Sri Lanka. The Geneva talks should be a prelude to a better future for the Tamils of Sri Lanka and not end up as one more disappointment in the long series that have preceded it.

by Harischandra

Two remarkable “U” turns by the chief actors have for the time being helped prevent the Sri Lankan shadow war drama from escalating into full scale war. The Norway facilitated joint decision by the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to commence talks in Geneva on February 22 nd has reduced greatly the violence and resultant tensions. prevailing very recently.

It is well - known that the agenda of the proposed Geneva parley will at present be strictly confined to the ceasefire agreement and to that alone. Several LTTE personalities as well as Erik Solheim have reiterated this position again and again. Yet the Mahinda Rajapakse regime continues to regale Sri Lankans with media reports about elaborate preparations being made to “train” the Government negotiating team in the finer points of federalism - confederation as well as the differences between unitary and united. They will also be taught negotiating skills.

The entire exercise seems an amusing charade at which the nation could laugh if not for the fact that the future of the Country is at stake. What is required in Geneva is not a debate about Constitutional reform or power sharing formulae but a thorough focus on the prevailing ceasefire. It is not a debating forum to blame each other or score brownie points. How can the parties involved strengthen the ceasefire and prevent a possible collapse? This is the most important question for Geneva. Indeed the solitary question at this point of time. Yet the Rajapakse regime spending its time on other details seems oblivious to this aspect. This indicates either colossal ignorance or massive duplicity.

What is essential at Geneva is for both sides to commit themselves sincerely to the preservation of the ceasefire. From an LTTE perspective this requires solemn pledges cum implementation on the part of the Government to dissolve the so called paramilitary groups in the East and even more importantly in the North. It would also mean a genuine commitment not to deploy the deep penetration squads against LTTE leaders. Moreover the state would be required to abandon its recent move to arm Muslim groups in the East. Apart from the question of “alternative armed groups” issue the LTTE would also expect the Government to commit itself about downsizing high security zones in terms of the CFA. Ensuring security of tiger political cadres in Govt controlled areas and reducing harassment of Tamil civilians are also on the agenda.

The LTTE position would be that all these issues are clearly covered under the existing ceasefire and that they have to be honoured fully for the ceasefire to continue. The peace process rests on the ceasefire. The Government on the other hand would be required to provide clear cut guarantees with time frames on this. Sarath Fonseka the man who refused to dismantle security zones in Jaffna is at the helm of the army now. It does not require much clairvoyance to foresee the future on this crucial issue.. Also having “scented blood” through the recent use of alternate armed groups as well as deep penetration squads it remains a moot point as to whether the state would be willing or is in a position to adhere to LTTE requests on this issue.

Against this backdrp the chances of any meaningful breakthrough in Geneva seem very slim. Yet the government in a blatant cosmetic exercise tries to build up an euphoric image that can only explode in its face. While these preparations go on there are media reports about Mr. Tiran Alles maintaining regular contact with Kilinochchi. With Mr. Alles running the RRDA there is speculation that some understanding has been reached with the LTTE about disbursing funds for tsunami rehabilitation in the North - East. If this is indeed correct then it is this “deal” that would help preserve the fragile ceasefire and not the “boru show” in Geneva.

This brings us to the 4.5 billion US $ question about why Geneva became necessary at all. The Geneva conclave became a distinct possibility due to positional shifts by the GOSL and LTTE. A brief re- run of the recent past first.

Mahinda Rajapakse depicted in sections of the media as being “hawkish” on the ethnic question was elected to office on a Sinhala hardline platform. Furthermore his chief allies are the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). That both parties espouse policies non - conducive to an Oslo facilitated negotiated settlement on federal or quasi - federal lines was obvious.

The initial signs after Rajapakse’s elevation pointed to a hardened approach. From the Prime Minister to Defence Adviser most of Rajapakse’s appointees were Sinhala hardliners. It appeared that Colombo was gearing up for war. Since Rajapakse envisaged a solution within the Unitary state structure that rejected the concepts of “homeland” and “Self - determination” there seemed very little common ground with broad Tamil aspirations as opposed to those of the LTTE.

The turning point according to some observers was the Rajapakse trip to India in late December last year. The new Sri Lankan president realised that New Delhi was neither interested in replacing Norway as facilitator nor keen to aid the war effort actively. It was also conveyed that India would like Colombo to continue with Oslo facilitated efforts to engage the LTTE in talks and arrive at a settlement moving away from the unitary state.

Apart from India there was also much pressure from other International players. The USA, EU and Japan backed Norway to the hilt and wanted talks. This meant that Rajapakse who opposed Norway’s role had to reverse his stance. Even as Rajapakse showed signs of adhering to International opinion there were doubts whether he could carry the JVP and JHU with him. It appears that Rajapakse has succeeded to some extent for now at least.. The JVP though unhappy remains silent for the time being while the JHU is openly critical but has not specifically opposed talks so far. Both parties have shown interest in participating at the talks though that seems highly unlikely.

Thus the Rajapakse regime which wanted Norway out and any talks with the LTTE to take place in Sri Lanka began back pedalling. It agreed first to Oslo facilitated talks resuming and then agreed to Europe being a venue from its earlier position that it should be in Asia. Colombo also was compelled to accept Erik Solheim as the premier intermediary. It had earlier attempted to get him replaced as a face saving measure.

It was against this backdrop that Solheim now the Norwegian minister of Overseas Aid arrived in Sri Lanka on Jan 23rd. London based LTTE political adviser and chief negotiator Anton Balasingham also arrived in Colombo on the same day. After meeting with President Rajapakse Solheim also went to Kilinochchi to meet LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan on Jan 25th. It was then announced that the GOSL and LTTE will hold direct talks in Geneva.

If on the one hand GOSL flexibility had aided this positive development , the LTTE too had softened its stance on the other. Though Prabakharan had gone on record in his Great Heroes day address that he was prepared to grant Rajapakse some time developments on ground deemed otherwise. Incorporating elements of the Palestinian Intifada and Iraqi resistance the LTTE launched a stealth war in the North.

LTTE front organizations demanded the withdrawal of security forces from the North and downsizing of high security zones.Security personnel were targeted . Attacks ranging from Claymore mines explosions to pistol shooting resulted in 74 security personnel being killed in six weeks.The tiger game plan seemed to be maintaining pressure until one of two things happened. Either President Rajapakse called the ceasefire off and declared open war or the security forces incensed by the attacks engaged in a large scale civilian massacre. Then the LTTE citing it as cause would declare war.

This did not happen mainly because President Rajapakse remained remarkably patient and the security forces showed overt restraint. The LTTE instead of continuing its course has now suspended its so called “peoples war” and opted for talks. What made the LTTE revise its stance? There is a consensus that International opinion caused it. From India to the EU the pressure on both sides to talk was overwhelming. In a significant show of words Lunstead the US envoy to Colombo as well as State dept under - secretary Burns warned the LTTE harshly about consequences of going to war.

Though International pressure played an important part in influencing the LTTE decision there was another crucial additional factor too. What has been glossed over or downplayed in this regard is the fact that tiger plans went awry due to an unexpected factor. Instead of letting the LTTE have a sole monopoly on violence other actors too got into the fray. For the first time in many years many persons suspected of being LTTE or supportive of the LTTE were targeted in the North.

It is an open secret that the LTTE faction led by former Eastern tiger commander Vinayagamurthy Muraleetharan alias “Col” Karuna has been conducting a campaign of violence against the mainstream LTTE in the East. This had checked tiger activity to a great extent and restricted functional ability and mobility in the East. Now the shadow war began moving to the North also.

Groups of Tamil youths with logistical support provided by the security forces and Police began targeting tiger supporters or suspected supporters in the North. These allegedly comprised members from five different Tamil groups as well as ex - members. The LTTE calls them “paramilitary” but the Norway led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission calls them “Alternative Armed Groups”.

These elements began targeting “tiger” targets. From a Human Rights perspective the campaign was deplorable but from a military strategy viewpoint it was a very successful counter - terrorist strategy.Well - Known tiger supporters as well as family members of dead or living LTTE members were targeted. Some simply went “missing” with charges of being abducted in vehicles with unlicensed number plates. Even people involved in helping with LTTE ceremonial functions were killed.

This resulted in many Tamil civilians being killed. The Kilinochchi based human rights organization NESOHR claims that 107 people were killed in two months.There are registered complaints about another 33 being missing. A climate of teror prevailed. Usually terror is inflicted by the LTTE on those it regarded as the “enemy”. Now the situation was different. Those supportive of the LTTE were being terrorised. This resulted in tiger supporters particularly those from families with LTTE connections relocating hastily from Jaffna to the LTTE controlled Wanni region for safety. It is estimated according to NESOHR that 16, 431 people have moved into LTTE areas within a six week period.

One important consequence of this forced migration was that the LTTE support base in Jaffna was diminishing.. These families many of whom moved to Jaffna from the Wanni after the ceasefire were suspected of providing support in many ways to the tigers in the so called “peoples war”. Now these families were moving out of Jaffna. Others were made “afraid” to render support. Besides the movement of many pro - tiger elements were restricted. With the LTTE gradually losing its support base the level of anti - security violence also began decreasing.Reprehensible as it was the counter - insurgency strategy proved a point that the LTTE understood only the language of violence!

The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) forbidden by the CFA were also revived.Earlier these LRRP groups had penetrated deep into LTTE territory and ambushed senior tiger leaders. Among those killed in this fashion were “Col” Shankar the head of the LTTE air wing, Lt. Col Gangai Amaran the deputy commander of the sea tigers and Major Nizam chief of Batticaloa - Amparai Intelligence. Other seniors like Thamilselvan, Balraj, Karikalan, Jeyam etc had narrow escapes.

The revival of LRRP attacks resulted in a LTTE “major” being killed in Iranaiiluppaikkulam in Vavuniya district and two “Captains” being killed in Thambalagamam in Trincomalee district. It was also reported that LTTE political Commissar SP Thamilselvan narrowly escaped death again when an LRRP landmine ambush was set up in Pappamottai in Mannar. These attacks forbidden by the ceasefire agreement increased pressure on the LTTE.

In another development smacking of racial discrimination 600 Sinhala and Muslim youths in Trincomalee were recruited and trained as homeguards. Apart from this there are allegations that Muslim youths in Amparai and Trincomalee districts have been armed and are being used as “unacknowledged paramilitaries” against the LTTE and Tamil civilians. Some recent killings of Tamils in Akkaraipattru and Mutur are attributed to these Muslim groups by the LTTE. In two separate meetings in Pavattai in Amparai and Sampur in Trincomalee senior tiger leaders addressed a cross section of Muslim civil society and warned them of this development.

With the net tightening the LTTE was being constricted slowly. It was in this situation that the LTTE softened its stance and agreed to go for talks in Geneva.In typical LTTE style the tigers projected an impression that they were doing so in the interests of the Tamil people and to give Mahinda Rajapakse another chance.Anton Balasingham stated explicitly at the press conference after the Kilinochchi meeting with Erik Solheim that the tigers were going for talks to prevent the relocation of the Tamil people. He stated that is why Prabakharan had “climbed down” (Irangi vanthu) from his earlier position.

It appears that the LTTE has agreed to talks at this stage to prevent further targeting of tiger supporters and their forced relocation from Jaffna. This support base is a potential fifth column if and when open war erupts. The LTTE will not like to let this fifth column decrease in numbers and lose its potency. The talks therefore will help freeze the status quo.

Already the killings and abductions by the anti - tiger elements have virtually ceased in the North. The pro - tiger “civilian force” has announced a moratorium on violence. It is interesting to note that the tigers who denied any involvement in the Jaffna violence have guaranteed an end to it if tiger supporters being targeted stops.

In the prevailing situation the LTTE will utilise the talks to press for several demands. It will state that certain measures will have to be taken or implemented to strengthen the ceasefire. One of these will be the disbanding of “paramilitary” forces or alternative armed groups. The media at large refers only to the Karuna led Eastern groups when taking of paramilitaries. What is ignored is the paramilitaries operating in the East. From a tiger perspective this phenomenon is far more serious as it is essentially a state sponsored one whereas in the East it was originally an internal split in tiger ranks.

Against this backdrop the tigers will insist that violence against its supporters should cease and that the paramilitary issue be “firmly” resolved. It has been LTTE practice to obtain through talks what it cannot achieve through violence.

Anton Balasingham has also said that a climate of normalcy should prevail in the N- E for the talks to commence in Geneva. This means that a resurgence of anti - tiger violence could have resulted in the LTTE refusing to participate in Geneva. The killing of the LTTE ’s Major Kapilan by the Karuna faction in the East as well as the alleged abduction of civilian employees of the pro - tiger Tamil Rehabilitation Organization in Batticaloa have posed a threat to the fragile situation. Yet the LTTE has opted to go to Geneva.

Given this background it does seem clear that a compelling factor in the LTTE decision to go to Geneva is the desire to prevent the anti - tiger violence and bring about an end to the paramilitary “problem”. On that basis the tigers are likely to pull out of Geneva talks if their supporters are targeted on a large scale again. Despite the current euphoria the ground situation does not offer much hope since the Government too cannot give in to possible LTTE demands at this juncture.

As far as the state is concerned there is no doubt - notwithstanding its denial - that it is very much involved with the “alternative armed groups”. Sadly for Colombo its most effective “power” is not its armed forces or Police but the “assassins” of these “paramilitaries” and “deep penetration squads”. Moreover it hopes to counter the LTTE in war through the deployment of these groups particularly the Karuna faction. With the bona fides of the LTTE being in doubt over its genuineness in seeking a peaceful settlement the state simply cannot afford to disband or hand over the other groups to the LTTE. Whereas the top priority for the LTTE in Geneva will be this issue.

Under these circumstances the only “optimistic” silver lining in this dark “pessimistic” cloud is the fact that both sides have at least agreed to talk to each other directly in Geneva.This by itself is no cause for complacent satisfaction. Though Mahinda Rajapakse seems to be peering into the future of Geneva through rosy - tinted spectacles there are three doubtful areas about the future direction of the proposed confabulations.

One is whether the proposed Geneva talks will continue as scheduled if serious violence erupts. While the LTTE has to keep the so called civilian protests under check the state has to control the regular security forces along with the paramilitaries, deep penetration squads, homeguards and other alternative armed groups.

The next is about the outcome of these talks. Will there be satisfactory decisions reached and more importantly will those be implemented? The past in this respect does not offer much hope for the future.

The third is whether these talks will progress to a point where substantive issues pertaining to a lasting political settlement will be discussed?. The answer to all these questions lies in the sincerity and willingness of both sides to honour the four year old Ceasefire in letter and spirit.

by Dr. S. Narapalsingam

The efforts to start Eelam War IV failed for the reasons set out in some detail below. In short, this time the conditions in Sri Lanka were different and importantly there were external pressures against the resumption of hostilities. The LTTE’s strategy to resume full-scale war by provoking the enemy failed. On the contrary, the outside world praised the Sri Lanka government for the restraint maintained during the challenging time. This may well be due to the fact that the LTTE is militarily stronger now than it was 4 years ago. Nevertheless, an opportunity for resolving the ethnic conflict has come again. Time is crucial and just talking and vacillation will result in the loss of another opportunity. At present there is no sign the promised new approach to ‘honourable’ peace is in place.

According to Operational Headquarters, Ministry of Defence between December 1, 2005 and January 26, 2006 seventy seven Security Forces personnel and Police constables were killed by the LTTE either by firing at them or in explosions. Fifteen more Naval troops are believed killed after they went missing in the sea following two LTTE attacks in Trincomalee and Mannar. The Operational Headquarters statement said: “In addition 182 Security Forces and Police personnel received serious injuries in LTTE attacks during this period ending January 26, 2006. The LTTE was also responsible for the murder of 42 civilians who opposed their views during these two months”. The death toll during the period reported by independent local and foreign media is higher. Over 200 lives have been lost since President Rajapakse assumed office in late November 2005. The stepped up attacks against the government troops resulted in the death of nearly 100 soldiers.

In an interview with an Indian magazine, Tehelka, Helen Olafsdottir spokesperson of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) told: “We have no proof that the army is directly supporting the Karuna group but we know that some local army officers had knowledge of the whereabouts of some Karuna supporters”. She said Tamils in the north and east of Sri Lanka were being harassed by government troops. Referring to LTTE’s claims that “people” were to blame for the bloody attacks on the Sri Lankan forces from December 4, 2005, Olafsdottir said: “SLMM finds this explanation unacceptable. The LTTE’s involvement cannot be ruled out. It is, however, also true that people are suffering and there have been several reports of civilian harassment by the security forces. So widespread was the violence in the north and east of Sri Lanka that there was no accountability”, she said.

U.S. Pressure

In his address to the American Chamber of Commerce in Sri Lanka on January 9, 2006, Ambassador Jeffrey Lunstead said: “The U.S. calls on the LTTE to stop its violent activities and to return to the negotiating table with the Government of Sri Lanka in order to work towards a stable, permanent peace. There can be a role for the LTTE in future development of Sri Lanka, but only if it returns to the peace table, renounces terrorism in word and deed and become a responsible participant in Sri Lanka’s future. And this will lead to a better life for the Tamils and all Sri Lankans in the North and East.

The LTTE’s current actions call into question its “leadership” of the Tamil people. What kinds of leaders block their people from realizing their most fundamental democratic aspirations? What kinds of leaders allow their people to continue to suffer from a lack of investment and industry? What kinds of leaders continue to pursue violence when the clear benefits of peace are obvious? These are not acts of leadership. They directly undermine LTTE claims to legitimacy and they keep the aspirations of the Tamil people bottled up”.

The warning was direct and clear. The Ambassador said: “Through our military training and assistance programs, including efforts to help with counterterrorism initiatives and block illegal financial transactions, we are helping to shape the ability of the Sri Lankan Government to protect its people and defend its interests. Let me be clear, our military assistance is not given because we anticipate or hope for a return to hostilities. We want peace. We support peace. And we will stand with the people of Sri Lanka who desire peace. If the LTTE chooses to abandon peace, however, we want it to be clear, they will face a stronger, more capable and more determined Sri Lankan military. We want the cost of a return to war to be high”.

Several Tamil associations in the U.S in a joint memorandum to the Secretary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice and to Nicholas Burns, the U.S Under Secretary of State for political affairs objected to US Ambassador’s comments. They expressed the wish that Under Secretary Burns arriving in Colombo on January 23, “will clarify to everyone what US policy is at this critical time, and help revive the peace track.” They considered Jeffrey Lunstead’s address as partisan containing provocative message to the LTTE. The memorandum stated: “One central question is why Mr. Lunstead engaged in such a reckless exercise at a time of great risk to the peace process, and just a few days before Mr. Erik Solheim’s visit, which everyone was looking to as the only way of defusing an extremely dangerous situation”. The Norwegian Minister for International Development and Special Peace Envoy, Erik Solheim also arrived on January 23. Further more, the memorandum stated: “Whatever his intention or the limits of his authority, Mr. Lunstead has helped harden the respective positions of the LTTE and of the strong Sinhala chauvinist elements in the Government, and especially the military (which is virtually all Sinhala). He has seriously complicated the difficult and delicate task of Mr. Solheim in getting the two sides to resume political contact, and also raised serious questions about the US role in the peace process”.

However, in Colombo the U.S Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns not only endorsed the Ambassador’s remarks but also gave a sterner warning to the LTTE accompanied by the call to Colombo to investigate reported abuses of Tamil minority in the island. At the press briefing in Colombo, he said: “We’re very proud of the efforts of the American Embassy here, of Ambassador Lunstead, who has done such a wonderful job to represent the United States. We are a great friend to this country. We support its territorial integrity. We support the preservation of peace. We work very closely with the government and we’re proud of what the United States has been able to do as a friend to Sri Lanka”. He further said: “We call upon the LTTE, especially, to cease and desist from the violence and terrorism that it has afflicted upon the people of this country. The bombing this morning, which cost two lives; the repeated attacks over the past several weeks; and of course the attacks over many, many years upon the political leadership and the average citizens of this country, are reprehensible and they are condemned by the international community”.

“And we hope that the LTTE will understand that it will have no relationship with my government and, indeed, no effective relationship with any country in this world as long as it seeks to redress its own grievances through the barrel of a gun. Now, we understand the Tamil community here has legitimate grievances, and legitimate issues that ought to be addressed by the government. And there ought to be a dialogue, a better dialogue, between the government and the Tamil community. But the responsibility here lies with the LTTE, which has taken up terrorism and violence as its political weapon”.

To the question about some kind of direct role the U.S. can play in bringing about a final settlement to the conflict in Sri Lanka, Under Secretary Nicholas Burns said: “If there’s any weight that America can bring, it is to try to convince the LTTE to come in and negotiate, and to try to give advice to our friends in the government that they ought to find a way not to respond to the obvious provocations of the last several weeks. I think that is really what America can do best here. We’re a friend of this country. We respect its territorial integrity and want to see it preserved. And the people of this country ought not to have to live for another 15 or 20 years with this reprehensible terrorist group keeping this country verged on the edge of war. What is striking about the situation here, in Sri Lanka, is how so many people are concerned about the possible outbreak of conflict, of armed conflict, of a civil war. It is incumbent upon all the friends of this country to band together, as we have in the Co-chairs group (U.S, EU, Japan and Norway), to send a message that we support peace, and that we’ll do whatever we can diplomatically to help prepare the road for peace. At the same time, we are trying to show our support for the government by providing military assistance and training for its officers, military exercises between our troops and the government’s troops, so that the government can be strong and the government’s forces can deter future attacks against the people of this country”.

He made it very clear that the “burden of peace rests with the LTTE”. The problem with redressing the grievances of minority Tamils through dialogue is that past bitter experiences have led to the conviction that the governments controlled by the majority Sinhalese cannot be trusted. Broken promises, abrogated pacts and non-implementation of enacted legislations and approved policies for addressing the grievances and concerns of Tamils have eroded whatever trust that existed at the time of independence. In the case of the Provincial Councils set up in terms of the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, the powers were not fully devolved as intended. The intent for which the system was introduced remains unrealized. In fact it is this disbelief that is helping the LTTE to sustain its demand for absolute self-rule with little or no links with Colombo. In 1987 India decided to be a guarantor of the agreement reached with Colombo intended to address the Tamil grievances but the accord was rejected by the LTTE as falling far short of Tamil aspirations. The ineffective PC system has, paradoxically, justified LTTE’s rejection!

Geneva Talks

Following the meetings Erik Solheim had with President Mahinda Rajapakse and later on January 25 with the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in Kilinochchi, it was agreed to hold talks with the Sri Lanka Government in Geneva, Switzerland. The LTTE chief negotiator and political strategist Anton Balasingham, who will lead the LTTE team at the talks, told reporters in Kilinochchi on January 25, “the talks would concentrate on the implementation of the clauses in the February 2002 agreement with the view to ensure “smooth implementation of the CFA”. He also said that the LTTE is giving the newly elected Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapakse, “another opportunity” to take up the peace process. Earlier, the LTTE leader in his Heroes’ Day statement (27 November 2005) made an urgent appeal to the Sri Lanka Government, “to offer a reasonable political solution to the ethnic conflict without further delay”. This was followed by a warning, ”if the government opts for a hard-line position and adopts delaying tactics, we will, next year (2006), in solidarity with our people, intensify our struggle for self-determination, our struggle for national liberation to establish self-government in our own homeland.”

Anton Balasingham also told reporters: “Talks on further matters may only take place after complete cessation of the “Sri Lanka military’s violent repression of the population in Government held areas of the Northeast”.

According to informed analysts there was a compelling need for the LTTE to agree for direct talks with the Government. The U.S government’s outright condemnation of LTTE’s continued practice of killing opponents to gain absolute control over the Northeast and the travel ban imposed by the EU with the warning to declare it as a terrorist organization had dimmed the rebels’ hope of gaining international legitimacy. The latter was pursued persistently, even after the U.S, Britain and other countries had proscribed it. India was the first country to ban the organization after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

Moreover, the LTTE is desperate to end the challenges it faces in the East from other armed groups, especially the breakaway Karuna group. In fact, the Vanni Tigers have reiterated during Solheim’s visit their demand that the paramilitary forces must be demobilized and disarmed by the Sri Lanka Government. The Karuna group is also considered a paramilitary unit by the mainstream LTTE after it failed to wipe out the defectors. The LTTE, as the Former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and others have said, will insist at the Geneva Talks that the government must disarm the ‘paramilitary’ Karuna group in order to implement effectively the CFA. But the SLMM considers the fighters in the breakaway Karuna faction as ‘Alternative Armed Elements’ because as mentioned earlier the Monitoring Mission has no proof that the army is supporting this group.

In a pre-emptive move, V. Muralitharan (Colonel Karuna), Leader of the TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) announced on January 29 a unilateral cessation of their “self-defence campaigns” against the Vanni Tigers to enable President Mahinda Rajapakse to negotiate a permanent peace settlement for the Tamils and Tamil-speaking people in particular and to Sri Lanka in general. Whatever the motive, this is a positive development for creating a conducive climate for confidence building and seeking a viable political solution to the ethnic problem.

Watchful U.S. and EU

Unlike India which is observing the developments with regard to the peace process in neighbouring Sri Lanka quietly, both the U.S and EU two co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors’ Conference provide strident comments. Following the January 25 Agreement to hold direct talks on the CFA in Geneva, Sean McCormack, the U.S spokesman in Washington, D.C issued a press statement the same day. It said: “As Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns said during his January 23 trip to Sri Lanka, this long conflict will end only when the LTTE and the government resume discussions, and the LTTE are convinced to stop using violence and acts of terror as political weapons. The United States and the other Co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors’ Conference – the European Union, Japan and Norway – have called repeatedly for a return to the negotiating table to work towards a stable permanent peace. The United States remains fully committed to the Sri Lankan peace process. The United States commends the Sri Lankan government for its restraint in the face of recent provocative attacks and fully supports its efforts as it advances towards peace. We support the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. We call on both the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to take immediate action to prevent violence and to uphold the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement”.

The European Union also issued a statement welcoming the agreement between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE to hold talks in Geneva, Switzerland to reinforce the Ceasefire Agreement concluded in February 2002 and to improve its implementation. The EU also reiterated its full support for Norway’s role as facilitator in the peace process and expressed its “firm hope that the talks will help stabilise the situation in Sri Lanka and lead to a peaceful solution of the conflict”.

There is widespread belief that the tough stand of the U.S. against the LTTE ahead of the meeting Erik Solheim had with the LTTE leader on January 25 made his mediation task easier. In three statements within a fortnight, Washington made it abundantly clear that the cost of launching a new war would be very high for the LTTE. It also openly lent its full weight to Colombo, promising assistance to strengthen the fighting capability of Sri Lanka’s military.

The prompt reaction of U.S to the reported kidnapping of 5 TRO officials on January 30 while traveling from Batticaloa office to Vavuniya along with 10 other fellow Tamil humanitarian workers by unidentified gunmen after passing through the Welikanda, (Polonnaruwa District) Sri Lankan Army Checkpoint shows the alertness and concern of the Embassy in Colombo. The latter on January 31 in a statement called on the authorities to rapidly probe the incident. The U.S Embassy also called on all parties to exercise restraint and calm, especially in view of the forthcoming talks in Geneva on the ceasefire agreement. On January 31, five more persons, four TRO Pre School Education Development Center (PSEDC) personnel and their driver were reported missing. The TRO’s Headquarters in Kilinochchi in a press release issued late evening 23.00 hours said the team from the Eastern Province expected in Kilinochchi in the morning had not arrived. The question is: who would want to obstruct the Geneva talks even before the date has been agreed? There are conflicting reports that help the real culprits to avoid detection.

Change in LTTE strategy

It is widely known that the LTTE has been changing its strategy from time to time according to emerging exigencies. Soon after the February 2002 Cease-Fire Agreement, the London-based LTTE strategist Anton Balasingham said there has been no change in the policies and aim of the organization and that only the strategy has changed. Having realized further progress in gaining control over the North-East cannot be swift under the prevailing ‘no war’ conditions, the leadership seems to have decided that resumption of the armed struggle is necessary to liberate the remaining land under the control of the government. A sizeable portion of the North-East is under LTTE control; despite the resistance by the breakaway group led by former LTTE Batticaloa-Amparai special commander V. Muralitharan alias ‘Col. Karuna’. The latter is against the presence of the Vanni LTTE cadres in the Eastern Province.

The preparation for the ‘final assault’ to capture additional territory started before the November 17 Presidential election. The strategy this time to make the confrontation appear as mass uprising somewhat similar to the ‘intifada’ of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip must have also necessitated the election boycott. The claymore mine and grenade attacks as well as reprisal killings have been daily occurrences. The victims were members of the security forces, armed rebels and civilians. Although both the Government and the LTTE were reiterating they were committed to the truce, the frequent violent attacks prompted the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to ask whether the Ceasefire Agreement was still holding.

The creation of a separate Tamil state in Northeast Sri Lanka is considered by the LTTE leaders as a sacred duty of Sri Lankan Tamils. It is this obsession that is behind the neglect of many important factors that will determine durable peace and the future wellbeing of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Isolation will deprive the community of freedom, worldly knowledge, liberal outlook and social and economic advancement. Decisions to suspend the studies of the Jaffna University students, to delay the opening of the new Jaffna library and some others give cause for concern.

Former IRA member and Sinn Fein Chief Negotiator Martin McGuinness was in Colombo in January following the invitation extended by INPACT to come and share his experiences with the President, representatives of the TNA and other political parties in Colombo in moving from conflict to negotiation for sharing power in Northern Ireland. In an interview he said: “If I am to deliver any message to Sri Lanka, the most important would be that there need to be an end to the conflict and there should be a meaningful process of negotiation to deal with the issues that lie at the heart of the conflict”. He expressed the view that armed conflicts like the one between the IRA and the British government should not continue indefinitely because the people will not gain any thing but only endure intense suffering. He was for a broad participation in the peace process. He said: “If there are many stakeholders the process should be an inclusive negotiating process, because many people are suffering as a result of the conflict, and all sides have the responsibility to ensure that everyone is listened to”.

Permanent peace

The importance of Geneva Talks at the present time is different for the Government, the LTTE and the vast majority of the people yearning for permanent peace. It is peace that is uppermost in the minds of the people who have suffered immensely for more than two decades. The Tamil people in the war-torn areas are experiencing immense suffering, because of displacement, loss of family members and in many cases the breadwinners, destruction of property and chronic poverty. Reduced income from present employment as well as lack of new employment opportunities have contributed to the latter. The immediate concern of the Government is to end the spate of killings. The number of soldiers and police officers killed recently increased significantly. President Mahinda Rajapakse in his first interview after the January 25 agreement said that the main aim of going into talks with the Tamil Tiger rebels in Geneva is to put an end to violence and thereby prevent people from getting killed. The LTTE as mentioned earlier is keen on averting further sanctions of foreign governments as well as getting the travel ban imposed by the EU lifted. The hard-hitting measures proposed by the U.S against the LTTE in the event it rejects the recommended peace path and resumes war have also compelled the rebel leader to agree for the CFA talks in Geneva. Disturbing incidents like the abduction of TRO personnel could be used to boycott the talks.

Talks with no intention to seek a final political settlement as happened not only during the current ceasefire but also during previous ones will only halt the bloodshed and displacement of families from their habitats temporarily. A recent AFP report has quite correctly said: “Prospects for real peace in Sri Lanka remain distant if not bleak, despite Tamil rebels and the government being pushed back to the negotiating table”. This assessment is based on the views of some independent analysts. Sunanda Deshapriya, director of Sri Lanka’s Centre for Policy Alternatives is reported to have said: “For real peace there is no chance at the moment. There may be a respite, but that’s the maximum there can be. I cannot see any development”.

Jeevan Thiyagarajah, director of the Consortium of Humanitarian Aid, a NGO also thinks that the prospects for peace are long term. “But the positive potential far outweighs the destructive potential,” he said, noting that aid of up to three billion dollars was at stake. He has called for a “moratorium on hostile acts” by all parties. Regarding the suggestion to focus in the interregnum on “rehabilitation and development goals covering the destruction wrought by the conflict, the December 2004 tsunami that killed 31,000 people and poverty,” the same problem that arose with regard to the agreed joint mechanism advocated by former President Chandrika Kumaratunga last year for post-tsunami relief and rehabilitation work would crop up again. Since the process needs a long time for a breakthrough, Deshapriya thinks that the LTTE will not wait. “They have the momentum and violence will continue, even during talks,” he opined.

If the LTTE is hell bent on establishing a separate state in Northeast Sri Lanka, the rebels will not be interested in building trust, rehabilitation and development. All the hardships endured by the people as a result of non-cooperation and quarrelling over managerial control and channeling of foreign funds etc were cited to justify separation. In fact the withholding of pledged funds by the donors pending progress in the peace process hurts the government and not the LTTE. Tamil Tigers are not in a hurry to develop areas in the Northeast under government control. The priority is on the eviction of the military occupying the land that the LTTE wants to liberate forcibly. The high security zone (HSZ) in residential and farming areas in the North is the prime target. The LTTE does not accept the view that this has to wait for a final political settlement.

Former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe said in 2002 that he was taking a step-by=step approach to settle the conflict. What happened later should be a lesson for the present Government. The LTTE did not wait for his planned steps. It had its own agenda and began implementing it swiftly. The LTTE leader gave a clear indication in his 2005 Heroes’ Day statement of his restlessness. He said: “Our people have lost patience, hope and reached the brink of utter frustration. They are not prepared to be tolerant any longer. The new government should come forward soon with a reasonable political framework that will satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people”. After the talks in Geneva, President Mahinda Rajapakse intends to take a new step-by-step approach to permanent peace. He has not said how he plans to persuade the restless LTTE leader to hold back his short-term plan for declaring de facto Eelam. It will be productive, if he takes Prabhakaran’s Heroes’ Day challenge seriously and come up with a “reasonable political framework” to satisfy the aspirations of all three communities, Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims.

Fundamental flaws

The Sri Lankan State as structured now is ethnocentric. The minorities cannot get a fair deal in any constitution based on Sinhala supremacy. This weakness must be rectified if permanent peace is sought through the resolution of the ethnic conflict within a united country. The acceptance of the true multi-ethnic character of the society and diverse settlement patterns of ethnic communities is fundamental to the resolution of the ethnic conflict. The distinction between the ethnic and separatist conflicts emphasized in my previous article is relevant here. The concepts of minority rights, pluralism and unity in diversity are not matters for negotiations, though their neglect were responsible for the disunity and unrest and finally for the present struggle for separation.

Afreeha Jawad in an article, ‘Unity in diversity - the principle of peace’ published in the Daily News of 20 January 2006 has quoted extensively the sensible statements of human rights activist and former minister P.P. Devaraj. Devaraj is a committed socialist, who has spent his entire life striving for the social and economic advancement of the upcountry plantation workers. He worked closely with the CWC leader the late S. Thondaman, who succeeded in improving significantly the lot of the estate workers. This writer is aware of the attempts made by both before the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom to enhance the income of the poor families by creating supplementary self-employment opportunities in domestic agriculture. According to Devaraj, all countries are increasingly moving into a multi-ethnic State. Multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism are intrinsic features of modern societies. He believes the present political discourse to finding a solution to the North East problem to be far from holistic. The problems of all minorities in its entirety need to be considered for national integration and peaceful coexistence of all communities.

Division of the country as contemplated by the LTTE will not produce permanent peace. People will not be able to move freely from North to South and vice versa. Given that the Tamils and Muslims are scattered communities right across the length and breadth of the island, they should be able to travel freely between different regions. Above all no country will recognize the break-away state. Not one country has mentioned it will accept division of the country as a last resort. The entire world is unanimous that Sri Lanka should remain as one undivided nation.

The dilemma facing Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the landslide victory of Hamas in the general election held on January 25 is worth mentioning here. It should be an eye opener for those who hope for peace and prosperity for the Tamils in Sri Lanka through separation sought by violent methods disapproved by the international community. Hamas, an Islamic militant group responsible for killing nearly 500 persons in about 350 attacks (about 50 are suicide bombings) since 1993 is officially listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. U.S President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders have demanded that Hamas renounce violence and recognize Israel or face isolation. U.S and EU provide bulk of the $ 1 billion given annually in aid to the Palestinian Authority. This aid supports education, health and other Palestinian development projects. Fatah party founded by the Palestinian leader, the late Yasser Arafat dominated Palestinian politics for 40 years. It gave up the armed struggle and launched the peace process jointly with Israel. Interestingly, Norway facilitated the talks that resulted in the peace process. On January 30 the EU, US, Russia and UN after the joint meeting in London announced, Hamas must declare commitment to non-violence and join the peace process. They said Hamas cannot be committed to violence and peace process at the same time. Now, the foreign aid required for financing the annual budget of the Palestinian Authority is at stake.

Concluding remarks

Clause 1.8 of the Ceasefire Agreement will be the major concern of the LTTE at the Geneva talks. This stipulates that “Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province”. Clause 1.8 should have been implemented in conjunction with other relevant clauses. If Clause 2.1 had been implemented effectively, the killings of civilians, abductions and disappearances that occurred after disarming the “Tamil paramilitary groups” would have been avoided. Clause 2.1 states: “The Parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment”.

When the LTTE continued with the killing spree targeting the unarmed political opponents and military informants and recruited children, the SLMM failed to name the party responsible for the violations. Had there been a peace keeping team, the violence that continued despite the CFA would have been minimal. If the aim at the Geneva Talks is to stop the violent activities by strengthening the implementation of the CFA, clause 1.8 must be considered along with other relevant clauses and in particular the role of the SLMM should be reviewed with the view to ensure effective monitoring and reporting. There has been no mechanism for follow up action. If the killings that occurred since 2002 and in particular during the past couple of months are to be avoided, some peace keeping force is needed.

Constitutional Affairs and National Integration Minister D. E. W. Gunaskera said at a recent meeting of the Advisory Council, the Geneva talks for strengthening the Ceasefire Agreement would help to build up an environment to begin peace talks. The Minister said that there can be no useful talks if mutual understanding and trust does not prevail among the concerned parties. This is also the view of President Mahinda Rajapakse and other leaders keen on a peaceful settlement of the prolonged conflict. It is true building trust is a two-way process. This is unimportant to committed separatists. Even the Tamils keen on settling the issue early within united Sri Lanka have some doubt whether the Sinhalese leaders will be willing or able to act as promised. The Government and the main opposition party agree they have to make a joint effort to resolve the national problem but the usual internal problems are preventing the leaders to start working jointly on the national problem. This is important for winning the confidence of the disillusioned citizens. The Tamils are yet to believe the southern polity will come up with a reasonable political solution. Although some may disagree with the violent methods used in the struggle for governing power and aims of the LTTE, they know without the Tigers the Tamils will revert back to the status of a powerless community with no hope of living with equal rights and dignity. Nothing has been done to negate this belief.

The main task in the short term will be to instate an effective arrangement to keep the peace. Rohan Gunaratna, a security analyst at Singapore’s Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies has said, “Other countries, including the United States, regional heavyweight India and the European Union, should be included in the process as guarantors”. This is necessary to ensure that the peace process does not remain deadlocked as happened since April 2003. A political settlement preserving the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka as desired by all donor countries especially India also needs guarantors for full implementation.

There are many challenges ahead that need to be overcome for making the case for separation unnecessary. The Government jointly with other moderate political parties and concerned apolitical groups must work seriously towards this end. After abandoning the draft constitution submitted to Parliament in 2000, no attempt has been made to prepare another draft. Mere declaration that federal system is suitable for fulfilling the aspirations of all ethnic communities is not enough. What is needed now is the willingness and courage to construct a political structure that will be considered as fair by the moderates in all three communities as well as the international community.

[TamilWeek, Feb 05]

by Dr. Rajasingham Narendran

The agreement to meet in Switzerland to discuss the ceasefire agreement brokered between the GOSL (government of Sri Lanka) and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam) by Norway has been welcomed with the sigh of relief by all the peoples of Sri Lanka- especially the war weary Tamils and the international community taking an interest in our affairs. The war clouds have given way to some sun shine and a ray of hope that miracles are yet possible. We have to be thankful to our creator that as humans we have been blessed with the ability to forget the past quickly and be always hopeful of the future, regardless how bad our situation is at present. However, it is necessary to view the current situation realistically, while awaiting the hoped for miracles.

On the fifty eighth anniversary of our independence from British colonial rule, which falls on the 4th of February, it is opportune to review the role of the GOSL in the affairs of the Tamils. The GOSL has miserably failed, regardless of the party holding the reins of power, to manage Sri Lanka as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural entity, bearing in mind that every citizen has equal rights and equal claims to protection from the law irrespective of his or her affiliations. Sinhala and subsequently Sinhala-Buddhist interests have been given primacy in all aspects of governance in Sri Lanka beginning with the government of D.S.Senanayake to the on-going one of Mahinda Rajapakse. The so-called historical grievances of the Sinhala people, the majority, were addressed at the expense of the minorities in a discriminatory, unjust, brutal and uncivilized manner, unbecoming of a nation claiming to be predominantly Buddhist. The result has been the disappearance of the small, but significant and colourful ‘Burgher’ (people of European origin) community, through what amounted to forced migration; and the severe depletion of the ranks of the indigenous Tamil community of the northern and eastern provinces, through a mix of brutality, economic strangulation and, political and social discrimination, which could be collectively described as calculated ethnic cleansing. The sense of frustration with ground realities and an inability imagine a secure and decent future in Sri Lanka forced large numbers of Tamils to flee the country.

What has been rather astutely described as the ‘Dutu Gemunu’ strategy was very cleverly deployed by the Sinhala political leadership to achieve their objective of a ‘Sinhala Dwipa (Sinhala Island)’, where the minorities are unseen, unheard and overwhelmed. However much the Sinhala leadership may have differed in the economic and developmental strategies over the past six decades, the common thread that has run through every single Sinhala dominated government has been this ‘Dutu Gemunu’ strategy. Some governments such as those of S.W.R.D and Sirimavo Bandaranaike were overtly and crudely espousing this strategy, while the others have pursued it in a more covert and sophisticated manner. This has been an unstoppable juggernaut, although slowed to a crawl at times by the presence of the Indian army and the actions of the LTTE. In these circumstances can we expect the problems of the Tamils in Sri Lanka to be addressed in a sensible and forthright manner by the government of Mahinda Rajapakse, given its avowed positions and composition? On the fifty eighth anniversary of independence what hope does Sri Lanka hold for the Tamils, Muslims and other minorities in Sri Lanka? This should be food for thought for the Sinhala people at large.

On the Tamil side the grievances have been genuine and in the past six decades they have been driven almost a century back in socio-economic terms. The problems of the indigenous Tamils of the Jaffna peninsula, Vanni and the east have been different in terms of ground realities, aspirations and, GOSL strategies and effects. The Tamils of the Jaffna peninsula were deprived of the opportunities in government employment, university education, professional endeavours and industry, on which pillars their economy was constructed through various measures adopted by the Sinhala dominated state. The Tamils in the Vanni largely dependent on rain fed agriculture and animal husbandry were not provided any avenues of progress and support in their traditional pursuits. Their lands also became targets for government sponsored Sinhala colonization, in the name of agricultural development, but with the covert objective of severing the contiguity of the Tamil dominated north and eastern provinces demographically. In the east, there was a deliberate attempt by the governments to change the ethnic composition and balance in favour of the Sinhalese and grab fertile and irrigable land in the guise of state-sponsored colonization schemes. The Muslims in the east were also the victims of this land grab. While the strategy in the Jaffna peninsula was to break the dominance of the Tamils in higher education, government employment, the professions and trade, in the Vanni and the east the strategy was to grab land, reduce the Tamils to a minority status and subvert the demand for recognition politically of traditional areas of habitation. In the Sinhala majority areas where the economic pie was centered, life for the Tamils was made impossible and unsafe, as part of the overall strategy.

In recent years, the Tamils have been permitted to re-settle in some Sinhala majority provinces, without the recurrence of government-sponsored ethnic riots, because of the threat posed by the LTTE and other Tamil militant groups, and a strategy to show the world that the bad old days are a thing of the past. Every time a war is threatened by the LTTE, the Tamils in the Sinhala dominated provinces have to panic and rue their fate, as there is yet no guarantee that the change of heart is genuine. This phenomenon is also becoming the unfortunate routine in the lives of the Tamils in the north and east. On all fronts the objectives sought as part of the Dutu Gemunu strategy since prior to independence by the Sinhala political leadership have been nearly achieved by the Sri Lankan governments. The demand for self governance and independence from colonial rule was as much that of the Tamil leaders as that of the Sinhala leaders of yester year. The reward of independence for the Tamils has been only ever increasing misery. Is there any hope of reversing the trend and regaining lost time in the coming years and decades, for the Tamils? I do not think so, if affairs are permitted to continue as at present.

What have the Tamils done in the past six decades and what have we achieved as a result? Are we better off or are we worse off now as a result of what we have done? Is there any hope that our present strategies and approaches would make things better for us as a people or make them worse?
Have the strategies we have hitherto adopted been appropriate for all the Tamils, considering their geographical distribution and differing aspirations. Have we got to accept that there is no one solution to the problems of the Tamils, considering their dispersion in the Jaffna peninsula, Vanni, eastern province and the rest of Sri Lanka? These are matters that require deep introspection from the Tamil community.

We have pursued in the past the parliamentary and democratic option to solve our problems through discussion, debate and persuasion. It did not work. We thereafter adopted the Gandhian strategy of peaceful public protest and civil disobedience. This too did not work. We thereafter whole-heartedly supported an armed uprising of Tamil youth, which evolved in to a vicious civil war. This too has not worked. However, when viewed as a composite, life has only got progressively worse for us in Sri Lanka since independence. In addition to coping with the evil machinations of the Sri Lankan government, we are now forced to bear the lethal burden of the militancy we emotionally, but irresponsibly succored, without establishing the necessary political controls. We are currently embarked on creating chaos in the Sri Lankan parliament through rowdy behaviour engineered by the LTTE and spe