tamilweek.com

By Dr.Rajasingham Narendran

“It is now crystal clear that the Sinhala leaders will never put forward a just solution to the Tamil national question. Therefore, we are not prepared to place our trust in the impossible and walk along the same old futile path.

The uncompromising stance of Sinhala chauvinism has left us with no other option but an independent state for the people of Tamil Eelam. We therefore ask the international community and the countries of the world that respect justice to recognize our freedom struggle. At this historic time when the Tamils are recommencing their journey on the path of freedom, we seek the unwavering support and assistance of the world Tamil community. We express our gratitude to the Tamil Nadu people and leaders for voicing their support and ask them to continue their efforts to help us in our freedom struggle. We express our gratitude to the Tamil Diaspora, our displaced brethren living all around the world, for their contribution to our struggle and ask them to maintain their unwavering participation and support.”- Vellupillai Prabaharan, Leader of the LTTE (27th November’2006)

With these words Prabaharan has pronounced the Ceasefire agreement (CFA) of February’2002 dead and well buried, although it was known to be lingering near death for almost a year now. The charade that the CFA was being observed by both the GOSL and the LTTE over the past year has to end now, despite the signals to the contrary emanating from Kilinotchi subsequent to Prabaharan’s annual speech. An independent Tamil Ealam has been categorically stated as the goal of the LTTE and the freedom struggle (euphemism for an open and violent civil war) has been pronounced to have recommenced. The focus on a negotiated settlement to the Sinhala –Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka, that commenced with the 2002 CFA, and has remained centre stage through the past four years, despite many a pressure, has definitively shifted now to war and a solution through violence. The shift towards these ends has not been dramatic, but gradually escalated, in a calibrated manner, to the present point since 2003, despite the efforts of many Sri Lankans and the international community to forestall this likelihood.

The reference to countries that respect justice in Prabaharan’s speech is intriguing, in the context of the LTTE being proscribed as an organization in India, the U.S.A, most of Europe and Canada. I wonder which countries Prabaharan had in mind, when he made this reference. By referring to the people of Tamil Nadu and its leaders, Prabaharan has cunningly sought to prevent a more direct anti-LTTE role for India in Sri Lanka. The Tamil Nadu factor in his expectations will tie Indian hands and will also prevent Sri Lanka from seeking greater assistance from India. The Tamil Nadu bogey that finds uncritical acceptance among the Sinhala political class at times such as this has been very cleverly exploited by Prabhaharan in this instance. While the support of the Tamil Diaspora has been passionately sought, the support of the Tamils and Tamil-speaking Muslims living in the north and east of Sri Lanka for a renewed violent struggle has not been sought, although the struggle is to be recommenced in their name and suffering. Their support has been either taken for granted or has been considered irrelevant by the LTTE. The question then arises whether the LTTE has lost the support of the local population and has become increasingly dependent on the support of an aggrieved, vociferous and vengeful Diaspora.

The report titled, ‘ SRI LANKA: THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS’ (Asia report # 124- 28th November 2006) of the International Crisis Group Working To Prevent Conflict Worldwide, should be compulsory reading for all those seeking an explanation and background to the current situation. However, this well researched report has failed to identify how the intent of the CFA and the expected outcome were sabotaged in a systematic and cynical manner by both the LTTE and GOSL, since its advent. Both parties to the CFA were not honest in their intentions and tried to use the CFA to pursue their individual long-term agenda. The CFA was the fig leave that unfortunately failed to hide what was behind it! The only achievement of the CFA has been that it has helped expose the hidden agenda of both the LTTE and the GOSL to the people of Sri Lanka and the world at large.

In a letter to a friend in October’2003, I had said, “Sri Lanka is currently enjoying a rather tenuous respite from twenty years of destruction, bloodshed, terror and insecurity. The peace we are currently enjoying in the Island is very deceptive and superficial at best. There are undercurrents of seismic proportions gathering strength and can erupt with a force never before experienced. If the current ceasefire is undermined or breaks down because of a failure to conclude a satisfactory power sharing agreement among the communities, what we would see is mayhem on an unprecedented scale”. I had gone on to write,” The current peace process is fraught with many difficulties because of the long history of strife and distrust between the two major communities. Unless there is mutual trust built-up, very rapidly, an ultimate solution will be a pipe dream. The leadership in this country, whether Sinhalese or Tamil, should set an example to the population at large, by directing their every thought, word and action towards consolidating the peace. This should be their penance to absolve themselves of past sins. Irresponsible and inflammatory words and actions can at this stage ignite a conflagration that would irreversibly damage the peace process from which both communities are benefiting”. Most of our leaders, whether Sinhalese or Tamils have however done everything possible to sabotage the peace process and a positive outcome in the past four years and engaged in a deadly game of Russian roulette with the gun pointed of course, as usual, at the civilian population. They have nevertheless vociferously expressed their commitment to the peace process at regular intervals. This ploy is described in Tamil as, “ Pillaiyayum Khilli, thottilaiyum artuvathu porla (Akin to pinching the infant while rocking the cradle).” The following salient sentences and paragraphs from the crisis group report are extensively quoted below, to objectively explain why the CFA failed to provide tangible solutions:

• “A major failing of the peace process was the inability of the government to begin to address some of the root causes of the conflict. This would have involved a broad range of measures, from language politics to reforming the security forces, that would have set the stage for a real deepening of the peace process as well as a reform of the Sri Lankan state that would have benefited all citizens.”

• “Neither side wanted to rush into substantive political issues; the government did not want the talks to meet an early impasse; the LTTE wanted to use humanitarian aid and reconstruction to consolidate its political hold over the population and establish a nascent state structure.”

• “The LTTE’s end game seemed deceptively simple. Prabhkaran’s rhetoric has always favoured what is termed “Tamil Eelam”, which is broadly understood as a separate state in the north and east. In reality, LTTE aspirations were never so clear-cut. Tamil Eelam always had an aura of a rather mystical utopia rather than a defined end goal. There was no blueprint for it, only some hazy 1970s Marxism as the basis for its economy and the evidence of the structures developed in the LTTE’s controlled areas, which suggested an extreme, if often inefficient, authoritarian state, which would retain power through repression rather than the ballot box.”

• “The Oslo declaration seemed to be a breakthrough in LTTE thinking, with its talk of ‘exploring federal solutions’. In reality, this was exaggerated by a media desperate to report some progress. LTTE thinking revolved around rather convoluted discussion about internal self-determination. This seemed to be an attempt to square an inconvenient circle, to develop a state without all attributes of statehood, perhaps an extreme form of confederation but one still far beyond what most Sinhalese politicians would conceive, and probably much more than most Tamils would settle for as well.”

• “The LTTE was hampered in discussing final political solutions by two main factors. One was its intolerance of debate and discussion outside the parameters set by its leaders. The other was the difficulty of maintaining mass mobilization if the final goal of the war was something less than an independent Tamil state. It was hard enough to maintain high recruitment and fundraising during the peace process: if the final outcome was likely to be a fudged devolution, the movement would probably lose much of its legitimacy among Tamil hardliners. Few people are prepared to die for a moderate, federal solution.”

• “If the LTTE was constrained in its ability to project forward to a possible final settlement that might be acceptable to the Sinhalese majority, the situation in the south, where debate was open and lively, was not much better. Although there were many statements of principles, and considerable discussion on the roadmap to peace, there was surprisingly little concrete discussion of what a final devolution package would look like in detail. Partly this was due to an understandable focus on the here and now, an attempt to address the realities of the peace process, rather than distinct goal. Partly it was a conscious decision by some that the process would be protracted, and a final settlement was too far away to discuss in detail. Finally, there was reluctance among politicians to be associated with any proposals that might subsequently prove to be political liabilities.”

• “In neither the proposal for an interim administration by the government nor by the LTTE was there any obvious commitment to democratic elections or pluralism. The ISGA offered elections after five years under the auspices of an LTTE-controlled Election Commission, with international observers. Only the most optimistic would think that such elections would be democratic after five years of LTTE rule. The government proposal, focusing on purely administrative arrangements, had no democratic elements.”

• “The problem for the government and the Norwegian facilitators was that the LTTE seemed unlikely to negotiate under any other conditions, and the war would continue. This was the presumption at least, and it was never tested by pushing the LTTE harder on the issues of human rights and pluralism.”

• “This paradox continues to plague attempts to broker peace. There has been little sign that the LTTE began to transform itself during the earlier process, although the absence of fighting certainly began to undermine internal cohesiveness.”

• “Unless the LTTE begins to address its democratic critics and show signs of internal transformation, any new peace process will be unable to achieve an acceptable outcome.”

• “The renewed military campaign has shown little regard for civilian casualties. The LTTE deliberately tries to surround itself with civilians and uses large- scale civilian deaths among the Tamils in its propaganda, knowing that they feed outrage among its supporters and increase pressure on the government. The military has obliged with a series of blunders and deliberate attacks, which have resulted in the deaths of civilians.”

• “The security forces have routinely ignored or covered up abuses. Inquiries into serious massacres and killings have produced no prosecutions. President Rajapakse’s proposal for a new presidential commission to investigate abuses has been met with skepticism given this history.”

• “Both sides are cynically exploiting the situation. The LTTE uses civilians as a fundamental part of its guerrilla strategy; the government seems to be using humanitarian aid to limit supplies to the LTTE and persuade people to move from LTTE positions.”

• “In addition to the humanitarian imperatives for better treatment, a politico-military aspect of present policies is hindering progress towards a political settlement. Embittered civilians make poor partners for the government’s attempt to win over the Tamil minority from the LTTE.”

• “Until the government makes a meaningful devolution proposal, the LTTE can argue it is not committed to a political solution.”

• “It was clear that a ceasefire agreement would include the two parties which controlled the means of violence; in the sense the bilateral approach was inevitable. As soon as talk of a political settlement began, however, all the excluded political actors began to make their presence felt and undermine progress on a political settlement. And as soon as a glimmer of a political settlement appeared, the problems of allowing any territory to be ruled by the LTTE- which showed no signs of embracing democratic values- became rapidly apparent.”

• “At the same time, the shift after December 2005, the increasing influence of chauvinist and militarist elements on government policy and the appalling human rights abuses that have become apparent in 2006, severely undermined any trust in the state to protect minority rights. As usual it has been civilians- Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslims-caught between TTE oppression and security force brutality, who bear the brunt of the violence.”

• “Many ideologues who came to power with President Rajapakse believe military power will fatally weaken the LTTE. The result has been a resumption of conflict and a disastrous year for Sri Lanka’s long-suffering civilians.”

• “But much of the responsibility for the failure of the process must also lie with the LTTE, which was seemingly incapable of compromising its goals and preferred renewed fighting to any negotiated solution. The hardliners are in the ascendancy on both sides.”

In a nut shell, though the CFA was signed and had the objective of seeking a negotiated settlement, with wide devolution of powers for the minorities within a united Sri Lanka, the LTTE was intent on using the loop holes in the CFA as an opportunity to advance its goal of an LTTE controlled Independent Tamil Ealam and the Sri Lankan government on the other hand was intent on leading the LTTE into a peace trap to weaken its hold on the Tamil population, while not conceding anything substantial by way of devolution of powers. Both the GOSL led at that time by the UNP and the LTTE did not follow through with the timetables and goalposts set in the CFA and found excuses for their respective commissions and omissions. The Norwegians and the SLMM were unable or unwilling to expose these initial violations and this resulted in their eventual emasculation.

The GOSL and the LTTE avoided dealing with substantive issues centered on devolution of powers and the necessary constitutional arrangements. As has become a historical routine in all preceding peace efforts, the regularization of normal life was given priority over substantive issues by both sides. Whenever conditions suited either party, the ‘Normal conditions’ were quickly and deliberately disturbed to become once again ‘Abnormal’, paving the way for renewed violence. Both the GOSL and the LTTE were playing to weaken each other, in order to achieve their pre-set objectives, rather than to seek long lasting solutions to the problems of the minorities and the country at large. Both LTTE cadres and GOSL soldiers were quite aware that the ceasefire will not last long, even as far back as June’2002!

This underlying duplicity gradually eroded the peace process and has ultimately led to its total collapse. Once the peace process began to lose its vigour and unravel, vultures in the form of former President Kumaratunge and her SLFP, the JVP and the JHU began to zoom into feast on the carcass of a dying peace deal, further contributing to its ultimate collapse. The arrogance and lack of wisdom on the part of the LTTE, led to the Karuna split, permitting the militaristic approach of the GOSL to gain strength. The failures of the LTTE including its inability to accommodate contrary opinion, gave room for dissent to emerge in public and expose its weaknesses to the world at large. The attempts by the LTTE to suppress debate and dissent by murdering or mud slinging those who dare to take a different viewpoint, contributed in no small measure to diminishing its stature among the Tamils and the world. The moral high ground the Tamils had attained through years of struggle and suffering was considerably diminished by the actions of the LTTE during the ceasefire. The Sinhala people who are now ready to concede considerable devolution of powers to the minorities, have on account of the failures of the current ceasefire and those preceding it, are against handing over any devolved power to the LTTE. The LTTE and its supporters are on the other hand taking the stand that the powers of self-governance that the Tamils want, is not for the Sinhalese to give, but for the Tamils to take. Unfortunately, the civilians on both sides of the ethnic divide and the Muslims have to pay a very heavy price on account of the failure of the GOSL and the LTTE to find acceptable solutions, through a mutually accommodative process.

Power, is sought by both the LTTE and the GOSL, to rule over the people, Tamils in the case of the LTTE and all Sri Lankans in the case of the GOSL. Unfortunately, the manner in which this power has been sought has remained quite primitive, considering that we are in the 21st century. Alvin Tofler in his bestseller ‘POWER SHIFT’ states,

“This is a book about power at the edge of the 21st century. It deals with violence, wealth and knowledge and the roles they play in our lives. It is about the new paths to power opened by a world in upheaval.”

“Despite the bad odor that clings to the very notion of power because of the misuses to which it has been put, power itself is neither good or bad.”

“Of the three root sources of social control, therefore, it is knowledge, the most versatile, that produces what Pentagon brass like to call ‘ biggest bang for the buck’. It can be used to punish, reward, persuade, and even transform. It can transform enemy into ally. Best of all, with the right knowledge one can circumvent nasty situations in the first place, so as to avoid wasting force or wealth altogether.”

“ Violence, which is chiefly used to punish, is the least versatile source of power. Wealth, which can be used to reward or punish, and which can be converted into many other resources, is a far more flexible tool of power. Knowledge, however, is the most versatile and basic, since it can help one avert challenges that might require the use of violence or wealth, and can often be used to persuade others to perform in desired ways out of perceived self-interest. Knowledge yields the highest quality of power.”

“Equality of power is an improbable condition. Even if it is achieved, chance will immediately produce new inequalities. So will attempts to rectify old inequalities. Some degree of inequality is a function of change itself.”

Power can be sought through violence, wealth and knowledge. In the Tamil liberation struggle in Sri Lanka, since the advent of the armed militancy, violence of different kinds and of different degrees of intensity have been brought to play. The violence has also been practiced in novel ways in this struggle, setting benchmarks for the world to take note. The Sinhala polity that had initiated the use of violence as a political tool in Sri Lanka has also gladly obliged with both random and institutionalized violence, in a tit for tat cycle of ever escalating violence. Modulated violence or force is often used in stable societies through the police services and the system of justice to maintain law and order. Greater violence of a more regimented and disciplined kind is the foundation of the armed forces of any country. Such violence is regulated by rules of engagement and other international conventions. Violence is often a necessary evil that has to be kept under control and used rarely and sparingly. What differentiates state- controlled violence and the unbridled violence of unconventional fighting units, under normal circumstances, is the degree of restraint and control that is operative when violence is resorted to. Directionless, unbridled, random, sadistic and barbaric violence when resorted to by a state or a liberation movement becomes terror. Both the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE can be accused of terror, while the LTTE has to bear the greater share of guilt on this score. The violence that followed in the wake of the Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka has rained misery beyond description on all the people in Sri Lanka, more so the Tamils. This violence has however resulted in the Tamil grievances being acknowledged by the world and the world’s attention getting focused on Sri Lanka. This could be cited as the only gain of the Tamil militancy to date.

Power can be also exercised through money or wealth. The Tamil militancy represented by the LTTE, has once again been innovative to the extreme on this score. It has been able to mobilize resources of the monetary kind, through means both fair and foul, to not only finance its military operations, but also sustain a powerful propaganda network and buy influence. This power of money (wealth) has been used largely in support of the violence that remains its main tool. The financial resources of the Tamil Diaspora, international aid and the other sources of revenue harnessed by the LTTE could have been instead directed towards creating wealth in the north and east of Sri Lanka, while using the CFA to provide the required political space. This would have developed the north and east at a rapid pace and drastically improved the lives of the people. This wealth creating approach, under the watchful eyes of the international community, coupled with the threat of renewed violence if necessary held in reserve, would have provided the Tamils the power to demand their rights. Unfortunately the LTTE has opted not to follow this tract and was not amenable to even consider this possibility, for reasons yet unexplained. The GOSL, which has been able to mobilize resources to fight an ever-escalating war, has singularly failed to mobilize the resources to develop the country and enlarge the economic pie. The economic realities underlying the conflict in Sri Lanka has never been acknowledged by Sri Lankan governments and given the attention deserved.

The third source of power is knowledge. This would imply the use of brainpower. Alvin Tofler in ‘Power shift’ quotes Winston Churchill to the effect that,” Empires of the future are empires of the mind”. While the LTTE has used knowledge of explosives, guerilla warfare, conventional warfare and weaponry, to enhance its capability to engage in violence; used knowledge of maritime, immigration, trade, financial and criminal laws governing several countries and the international system to garner funds to support its aims of a military nature; used brain power to pursue its often unstated objectives in a devious and calculating manner; it has miserably failed to use this brain power to resolve problems of the Tamils without subjecting them to unnecessary and unbearable trauma. The inability or refusal of the LTTE to pursue this option with greater vigour has resulted in the Tamil people being voluntarily offered as sacrificial goats, to often repeating cycles of violence. The failure to maximally harness the involvement of the international community in the peace process during the past four years towards seeking substantive solutions to the minority problems was historically a major mistake. The actions of the LTTE have also alienated the international community to a considerable extent and permitted the Sri Lankan government to gain considerable mileage. This is a major set back for the Tamil liberation struggle. The GOSL too has not been able to rise above primitive instincts and myth-based emotions, to work in an intelligent and rational manner towards long-term political solutions to a problem debilitating the nation and destroying its moral fiber.

Violence cannot continue to spearhead the Tamil struggle for political and economic liberation in Sri Lanka. The fact that the Tamil people resident in Sri Lanka, especially those living in the north and east, cannot be made to bear the brunt of a renewed war and the despair and destruction that follow in its wake, have to be recognized and factored into the plans of the LTTE. The on-going low intensity war is likely to explode into one of greater ferocity soon. The backbone of the Tamil community will be broken beyond recognition if this comes to pass. Whatever damages the LTTE may inflict on the rest of Sri Lanka in such a war; the Tamils will be affected to the greatest extent. The LTTE has to re-think its strategy and seek solutions that are feasible, practical and optimal. This is an urgent necessity. The LTTE should not sacrifice the helpless and forlorn Tamils and Tamil speaking Muslims yet living in the north and east of Sri Lanka at the alter of impractical and futile dreams. We have to pursue a more intelligent path harnessing our wealth creating potential and brain power to build on whatever little we have achieved through indiscriminate use of violence.

The Sri Lankan government and the Sinhala polity should reach a consensus on the extent of devolution they are prepared to offer the minorities. The emphasis should be on solving a long festering problem in an amicable, civilized and honest manner. This should be an urgent national priority. The military option should be exercised with caution, bearing in mind that the innocent civilians caught in the crossfire are Sri Lankans too. It is behooves the Sinhala polity, historically the primary instigator and aggressor in this conflict, to devise a generous, wise and appropriate political formula to end this never-ending conflict. The excesses of the Tamil militancy and the LTTE cannot be made the excuse to delay proposing meaningful solutions.

The 2002 CFA should be a lesson to everyone as to how the hopes of a people can be dashed to pieces by machinations of their leaders. The involvement of the Norwegians and international community did not also make a difference in this instance, as our leaders were intent on sabotaging the peace process from day one. I am sure the Norwegians and the other members of the international community were shocked by the attitudes of the two parties to this conflict. Everyone had a good time during the initial honeymoon, but the marriage has ended in rancour, without bringing forth any offspring. I hope our leaders will at least now have the hindsight to start afresh from this abysmal low. The international community should engage in Sri Lanka with renewed vigour and make us do what we are unable to do on our own. We have to be dragged towards a solution by the international community armed with a sledgehammer.