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Both sides should be creative and have enough time for informal talks

Unlike during the negotiations under the UNP, the talks would be characterized as two enemies confronting each other. This means that positional bargaining will be the order of the day. The challenge for both sides is how to develop a problem-solving format where common problems are discussed with a view to resolving them. For this, other formats need to be thought of. There is enough international experiences to draw upon. Back channels are necessary to create the space for informal dialogue between the parties.

By Kumar Rupesinghe

The talks to be held on October the 28 and 29 in Switzerland between the Government and the LTTE would most probably be the last chance that the country has towards reaching a negotiated solution. If the talks fail, then talks will not happen for a long time.

Sri Lanka has gone through a series of negotiations since 1977. All these negotiations had failed during the last 25 years. Each time negotiations failed the violence and destruction in the country had increased exponentially. If the talks fail this time, then it will set the stage for another war as has been announced by Thamilselvan in the Sunday papers, where the war would expand to all parts of the country. There would be no corner in the country which would be safe for its citizens.

War as an option for both sides

Both sides have been engaged in limited war as a means of changing the balance of power in the North and East. The LTTE started the process by sponsoring, through the Tamil Resurgence Force, claymore attacks on armed forces personnel and civilians. This attack was countered by the government through counterattacks on civilians through paramilitary forces who have caused havoc and mayhem in the country. The second phase of the war was characterized by the LTTE in the East by deciding to take over Mavil Aru and counter efforts of the government to regain it, and through these efforts to regain Sampur. Mutur became a theatre of war with a mass exodus of Muslims and Tamils reaching over 40000.

The government forces used their air capacity to the maximum with aerial bombings which caused significant civilian casualties. The government forces on the ground used its multi barrel artillery to its maximum and made significant damage to LTTE cadres in land and the sea. The Government tried to use the shock-and-awe strategies which were so effectively deployed in the theatre of battle in Kuwait by the U.S. armed forces. The LTTE, it seems, did not deploy its crack commando troops during the current phase of the battle.

The LTTE, on the other hand, retreated from Mavil Aru, Mutur, and the Forward Defence Lines (FDLs) in the North as was the pattern in previous engagements. The Eastern theatre has been abandoned earlier by the LTTE during the war-for-peace period but regained during the course of the fighting. In the first phase, government forces appear to be on the winning side until a planned retaliation and offensive is initiated by the LTTE. This took place with the debacle in Muhumalai and the subsequent suicide attack on unnarmed Navy personnel at Digampathana in Habarana and the suicide attack on the Galle Navy Base. In the course of the war in Sri Lanka, the Government has utilized conventional armed forces with air strike capability and Special Forces. The LTTE continues to use conventional war in the North, guerilla war in the East and terrorism in the South. They have also used special suicide squads to assassinate armed forces commanders and political leaders. The pattern has not changed with the difference that both sides have deadlier weapons and fighting capability. So far, the LTTE has refrained from attacking Colombo.

Both sides had violated the Ceasefire Agreement and had wanted to weaken the other side through armed engagements. There have now been over 2,650 political killings since the agreement was signed in 2002. The largest number of such violations has occurred during the Rajapaksa Presidency, with over 1,600 political killings and over 500 disappearances and abductions. The LTTE has used claymore mines with lethal effect against the armed forces. In entering the second round of talks, both sides have once again regained what they see as parity and equilibrium. Neither side has won or lost. This pattern of stalemate, changes in the balance of power and regaining equilibrium has been characteristic of the Sri Lankan conflict.

Another significant feature of this round of talks is that the North and the East have been de-merged by legal fiat. The TNA has threatened to boycott Parliament. The decision of the Supreme Court was a move by the JVP to cement the new balance of power in the East. The Muslims and the Sinhalese are concerned, for they will suffer the consequences in the years to come. The LTTE has scored a propaganda victory by showing the international community that the Sri Lankan State is not interested in a negotiated solution. The de-merger takes us back to the pre-Indo-Sri Lanka accord period. The new alliance between the UNP and the Government will have to address this issue soon.

Process design and architecture

It is time that both sides learn from the lessons of failed negotiations in the past. The propensity to learn through past mistakes is sadly lacking in the Sri Lankan experience. This is because each negotiation phase is characterized by a change of regime in the South. Every time before elections, the Opposition Leader has secret talks with the LTTE and makes promises which are unable to be fulfilled. Once in power, negotiations are resumed but soon break down and this cycle goes on. It is only during the final year of the Presidency that Presidents wish to share power with the other side and start negotiations in earnest and invite third party facilitation. With some minor exceptions, that was the pattern during the Jayewardene, Premadasa and Kumaratunga period. Each President’s attention span is short. They learn the history of the conflict whilst running, as it were. There is no institutional memory to rely on. The LTTE, on the other hand, is like a long distance runner where the same leadership has participated in all the talks. Each time they welcome the advent of a new President. The LTTE insists on confidence-building measures as a precondition for talks whilst the government’s wishes to discuss core issues. The LTTE uses its stratagem to consolidate its power and to rearm itself. These are familiar patterns which are characterized as the politics of duplicity.

The architecture and design of past negotiations have much to be desired. Both sides come with large delegations where the talks become a huge media exercise and each hour the media is fed with what is going on inside. In the beginning, there is a photo opportunity where the body language is stiff and heavy. At the end of the talks, a media communiqué is hastily issued and there is another joint media statement presenting the agreements reached. Both sides go back on the agreements even before they reach the country.

Unless there is a change in the architecture and design of the negotiation process, the talks are doomed to failure. Already the familiar noises are being made by both sides. The Government spokesperson has mentioned seven points which they wish to bring to the table insisting that the core issues should be discussed. This is even before these matters are quietly discussed with the facilitators. The Government side has stated that they wish to have a series of meetings within a given time frame. Everything happens through the media.

The LTTE, on the other hand, now says that it has no confidence in the Government but has decided to come for talks because of the invitation by the International Community. Thamilselvan then makes an announcement for us to wait for the next Heros’ Day speech where his leader would announce the new policy, and says that no part of the country is safe from war. They highlight the humanitarian concerns of the people in the North who are currently starving and live on a meal a day due to the high cost of essential items.

Confidence-building lessons

Managing expectations: It is better that both sides manage the expectations of their constituencies by not raising expectations with regards the current talks. Try not to make this a huge media opportunity. Try to downplay the media and refrain from conducting negotiations through the media. Let the facilitators determine the agenda through discussions with the parties and let there be agreement on the agenda before the public are presented with a wish list.

It is better to have low key discussions with a small delegation and relevant experts rather than over-dressed delegations from both sides where it is not possible to discuss constructively.

The agenda should be on a broad road map and confidence-building measures. By a broad map, I mean the reiteration and commitment to explore a Federal solution. This was the official position of both sides during the talks in Oslo. The LTTE must, without any ambiguity, clearly state that it is not for Eelam. The government must state that it would go beyond the unitary state. Once the end road is determined then the critical issue is to focus on the decisions taken in Geneva 1; to refrain from political killings. There must be, once again, a commitment to stop all political killings.

The most important factor is to discuss humanitarian issues. Here it is vital that a decision is taken on the A9 road and under what conditions it would be opened. The government has failed to ensure that essential items are distributed adequately in the North. The cost of essential items has sky rocketed and there are few private outlets for the distribution of essential items except from the cooperatives. Hospitals are under-staffed and medical supplies are wanting. There are also shortages of cooking and kerosene oil for the population. On the government side, they need to spell out their concerns regarding humanitarian space. Their concerns with regards humanitarian NGOs and access should be resolved. It is my view that the talks should be restricted, highly focused and without publicity.

There are many other lessons that have to be learnt by both sides if they are going to find a solution within a united Sri Lanka.

Unlike during the negotiations under the UNP, the talks would be characterized as two enemies confronting each other. This means that positional bargaining will be the order of the day. The challenge for both sides is how to develop a problem-solving format where common problems are discussed with a view to resolving them. For this, other formats need to be thought of. There is enough international experiences to draw upon. Back channels are necessary to create the space for informal dialogue between the parties.

The next round of talks is decisive. Both sides should take a leap in their imagination, be creative and have enough time for informal talks. [dailymirror.lk]