tw news-features

by Harischandra

Two remarkable “U” turns by the chief actors have for the time being helped prevent the Sri Lankan shadow war drama from escalating into full scale war. The Norway facilitated joint decision by the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to commence talks in Geneva on February 22 nd has reduced greatly the violence and resultant tensions. prevailing very recently.

It is well - known that the agenda of the proposed Geneva parley will at present be strictly confined to the ceasefire agreement and to that alone. Several LTTE personalities as well as Erik Solheim have reiterated this position again and again. Yet the Mahinda Rajapakse regime continues to regale Sri Lankans with media reports about elaborate preparations being made to “train” the Government negotiating team in the finer points of federalism - confederation as well as the differences between unitary and united. They will also be taught negotiating skills.

The entire exercise seems an amusing charade at which the nation could laugh if not for the fact that the future of the Country is at stake. What is required in Geneva is not a debate about Constitutional reform or power sharing formulae but a thorough focus on the prevailing ceasefire. It is not a debating forum to blame each other or score brownie points. How can the parties involved strengthen the ceasefire and prevent a possible collapse? This is the most important question for Geneva. Indeed the solitary question at this point of time. Yet the Rajapakse regime spending its time on other details seems oblivious to this aspect. This indicates either colossal ignorance or massive duplicity.

What is essential at Geneva is for both sides to commit themselves sincerely to the preservation of the ceasefire. From an LTTE perspective this requires solemn pledges cum implementation on the part of the Government to dissolve the so called paramilitary groups in the East and even more importantly in the North. It would also mean a genuine commitment not to deploy the deep penetration squads against LTTE leaders. Moreover the state would be required to abandon its recent move to arm Muslim groups in the East. Apart from the question of “alternative armed groups” issue the LTTE would also expect the Government to commit itself about downsizing high security zones in terms of the CFA. Ensuring security of tiger political cadres in Govt controlled areas and reducing harassment of Tamil civilians are also on the agenda.

The LTTE position would be that all these issues are clearly covered under the existing ceasefire and that they have to be honoured fully for the ceasefire to continue. The peace process rests on the ceasefire. The Government on the other hand would be required to provide clear cut guarantees with time frames on this. Sarath Fonseka the man who refused to dismantle security zones in Jaffna is at the helm of the army now. It does not require much clairvoyance to foresee the future on this crucial issue.. Also having “scented blood” through the recent use of alternate armed groups as well as deep penetration squads it remains a moot point as to whether the state would be willing or is in a position to adhere to LTTE requests on this issue.

Against this backdrp the chances of any meaningful breakthrough in Geneva seem very slim. Yet the government in a blatant cosmetic exercise tries to build up an euphoric image that can only explode in its face. While these preparations go on there are media reports about Mr. Tiran Alles maintaining regular contact with Kilinochchi. With Mr. Alles running the RRDA there is speculation that some understanding has been reached with the LTTE about disbursing funds for tsunami rehabilitation in the North - East. If this is indeed correct then it is this “deal” that would help preserve the fragile ceasefire and not the “boru show” in Geneva.

This brings us to the 4.5 billion US $ question about why Geneva became necessary at all. The Geneva conclave became a distinct possibility due to positional shifts by the GOSL and LTTE. A brief re- run of the recent past first.

Mahinda Rajapakse depicted in sections of the media as being “hawkish” on the ethnic question was elected to office on a Sinhala hardline platform. Furthermore his chief allies are the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). That both parties espouse policies non - conducive to an Oslo facilitated negotiated settlement on federal or quasi - federal lines was obvious.

The initial signs after Rajapakse’s elevation pointed to a hardened approach. From the Prime Minister to Defence Adviser most of Rajapakse’s appointees were Sinhala hardliners. It appeared that Colombo was gearing up for war. Since Rajapakse envisaged a solution within the Unitary state structure that rejected the concepts of “homeland” and “Self - determination” there seemed very little common ground with broad Tamil aspirations as opposed to those of the LTTE.

The turning point according to some observers was the Rajapakse trip to India in late December last year. The new Sri Lankan president realised that New Delhi was neither interested in replacing Norway as facilitator nor keen to aid the war effort actively. It was also conveyed that India would like Colombo to continue with Oslo facilitated efforts to engage the LTTE in talks and arrive at a settlement moving away from the unitary state.

Apart from India there was also much pressure from other International players. The USA, EU and Japan backed Norway to the hilt and wanted talks. This meant that Rajapakse who opposed Norway’s role had to reverse his stance. Even as Rajapakse showed signs of adhering to International opinion there were doubts whether he could carry the JVP and JHU with him. It appears that Rajapakse has succeeded to some extent for now at least.. The JVP though unhappy remains silent for the time being while the JHU is openly critical but has not specifically opposed talks so far. Both parties have shown interest in participating at the talks though that seems highly unlikely.

Thus the Rajapakse regime which wanted Norway out and any talks with the LTTE to take place in Sri Lanka began back pedalling. It agreed first to Oslo facilitated talks resuming and then agreed to Europe being a venue from its earlier position that it should be in Asia. Colombo also was compelled to accept Erik Solheim as the premier intermediary. It had earlier attempted to get him replaced as a face saving measure.

It was against this backdrop that Solheim now the Norwegian minister of Overseas Aid arrived in Sri Lanka on Jan 23rd. London based LTTE political adviser and chief negotiator Anton Balasingham also arrived in Colombo on the same day. After meeting with President Rajapakse Solheim also went to Kilinochchi to meet LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan on Jan 25th. It was then announced that the GOSL and LTTE will hold direct talks in Geneva.

If on the one hand GOSL flexibility had aided this positive development , the LTTE too had softened its stance on the other. Though Prabakharan had gone on record in his Great Heroes day address that he was prepared to grant Rajapakse some time developments on ground deemed otherwise. Incorporating elements of the Palestinian Intifada and Iraqi resistance the LTTE launched a stealth war in the North.

LTTE front organizations demanded the withdrawal of security forces from the North and downsizing of high security zones.Security personnel were targeted . Attacks ranging from Claymore mines explosions to pistol shooting resulted in 74 security personnel being killed in six weeks.The tiger game plan seemed to be maintaining pressure until one of two things happened. Either President Rajapakse called the ceasefire off and declared open war or the security forces incensed by the attacks engaged in a large scale civilian massacre. Then the LTTE citing it as cause would declare war.

This did not happen mainly because President Rajapakse remained remarkably patient and the security forces showed overt restraint. The LTTE instead of continuing its course has now suspended its so called “peoples war” and opted for talks. What made the LTTE revise its stance? There is a consensus that International opinion caused it. From India to the EU the pressure on both sides to talk was overwhelming. In a significant show of words Lunstead the US envoy to Colombo as well as State dept under - secretary Burns warned the LTTE harshly about consequences of going to war.

Though International pressure played an important part in influencing the LTTE decision there was another crucial additional factor too. What has been glossed over or downplayed in this regard is the fact that tiger plans went awry due to an unexpected factor. Instead of letting the LTTE have a sole monopoly on violence other actors too got into the fray. For the first time in many years many persons suspected of being LTTE or supportive of the LTTE were targeted in the North.

It is an open secret that the LTTE faction led by former Eastern tiger commander Vinayagamurthy Muraleetharan alias “Col” Karuna has been conducting a campaign of violence against the mainstream LTTE in the East. This had checked tiger activity to a great extent and restricted functional ability and mobility in the East. Now the shadow war began moving to the North also.

Groups of Tamil youths with logistical support provided by the security forces and Police began targeting tiger supporters or suspected supporters in the North. These allegedly comprised members from five different Tamil groups as well as ex - members. The LTTE calls them “paramilitary” but the Norway led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission calls them “Alternative Armed Groups”.

These elements began targeting “tiger” targets. From a Human Rights perspective the campaign was deplorable but from a military strategy viewpoint it was a very successful counter - terrorist strategy.Well - Known tiger supporters as well as family members of dead or living LTTE members were targeted. Some simply went “missing” with charges of being abducted in vehicles with unlicensed number plates. Even people involved in helping with LTTE ceremonial functions were killed.

This resulted in many Tamil civilians being killed. The Kilinochchi based human rights organization NESOHR claims that 107 people were killed in two months.There are registered complaints about another 33 being missing. A climate of teror prevailed. Usually terror is inflicted by the LTTE on those it regarded as the “enemy”. Now the situation was different. Those supportive of the LTTE were being terrorised. This resulted in tiger supporters particularly those from families with LTTE connections relocating hastily from Jaffna to the LTTE controlled Wanni region for safety. It is estimated according to NESOHR that 16, 431 people have moved into LTTE areas within a six week period.

One important consequence of this forced migration was that the LTTE support base in Jaffna was diminishing.. These families many of whom moved to Jaffna from the Wanni after the ceasefire were suspected of providing support in many ways to the tigers in the so called “peoples war”. Now these families were moving out of Jaffna. Others were made “afraid” to render support. Besides the movement of many pro - tiger elements were restricted. With the LTTE gradually losing its support base the level of anti - security violence also began decreasing.Reprehensible as it was the counter - insurgency strategy proved a point that the LTTE understood only the language of violence!

The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) forbidden by the CFA were also revived.Earlier these LRRP groups had penetrated deep into LTTE territory and ambushed senior tiger leaders. Among those killed in this fashion were “Col” Shankar the head of the LTTE air wing, Lt. Col Gangai Amaran the deputy commander of the sea tigers and Major Nizam chief of Batticaloa - Amparai Intelligence. Other seniors like Thamilselvan, Balraj, Karikalan, Jeyam etc had narrow escapes.

The revival of LRRP attacks resulted in a LTTE “major” being killed in Iranaiiluppaikkulam in Vavuniya district and two “Captains” being killed in Thambalagamam in Trincomalee district. It was also reported that LTTE political Commissar SP Thamilselvan narrowly escaped death again when an LRRP landmine ambush was set up in Pappamottai in Mannar. These attacks forbidden by the ceasefire agreement increased pressure on the LTTE.

In another development smacking of racial discrimination 600 Sinhala and Muslim youths in Trincomalee were recruited and trained as homeguards. Apart from this there are allegations that Muslim youths in Amparai and Trincomalee districts have been armed and are being used as “unacknowledged paramilitaries” against the LTTE and Tamil civilians. Some recent killings of Tamils in Akkaraipattru and Mutur are attributed to these Muslim groups by the LTTE. In two separate meetings in Pavattai in Amparai and Sampur in Trincomalee senior tiger leaders addressed a cross section of Muslim civil society and warned them of this development.

With the net tightening the LTTE was being constricted slowly. It was in this situation that the LTTE softened its stance and agreed to go for talks in Geneva.In typical LTTE style the tigers projected an impression that they were doing so in the interests of the Tamil people and to give Mahinda Rajapakse another chance.Anton Balasingham stated explicitly at the press conference after the Kilinochchi meeting with Erik Solheim that the tigers were going for talks to prevent the relocation of the Tamil people. He stated that is why Prabakharan had “climbed down” (Irangi vanthu) from his earlier position.

It appears that the LTTE has agreed to talks at this stage to prevent further targeting of tiger supporters and their forced relocation from Jaffna. This support base is a potential fifth column if and when open war erupts. The LTTE will not like to let this fifth column decrease in numbers and lose its potency. The talks therefore will help freeze the status quo.

Already the killings and abductions by the anti - tiger elements have virtually ceased in the North. The pro - tiger “civilian force” has announced a moratorium on violence. It is interesting to note that the tigers who denied any involvement in the Jaffna violence have guaranteed an end to it if tiger supporters being targeted stops.

In the prevailing situation the LTTE will utilise the talks to press for several demands. It will state that certain measures will have to be taken or implemented to strengthen the ceasefire. One of these will be the disbanding of “paramilitary” forces or alternative armed groups. The media at large refers only to the Karuna led Eastern groups when taking of paramilitaries. What is ignored is the paramilitaries operating in the East. From a tiger perspective this phenomenon is far more serious as it is essentially a state sponsored one whereas in the East it was originally an internal split in tiger ranks.

Against this backdrop the tigers will insist that violence against its supporters should cease and that the paramilitary issue be “firmly” resolved. It has been LTTE practice to obtain through talks what it cannot achieve through violence.

Anton Balasingham has also said that a climate of normalcy should prevail in the N- E for the talks to commence in Geneva. This means that a resurgence of anti - tiger violence could have resulted in the LTTE refusing to participate in Geneva. The killing of the LTTE ’s Major Kapilan by the Karuna faction in the East as well as the alleged abduction of civilian employees of the pro - tiger Tamil Rehabilitation Organization in Batticaloa have posed a threat to the fragile situation. Yet the LTTE has opted to go to Geneva.

Given this background it does seem clear that a compelling factor in the LTTE decision to go to Geneva is the desire to prevent the anti - tiger violence and bring about an end to the paramilitary “problem”. On that basis the tigers are likely to pull out of Geneva talks if their supporters are targeted on a large scale again. Despite the current euphoria the ground situation does not offer much hope since the Government too cannot give in to possible LTTE demands at this juncture.

As far as the state is concerned there is no doubt - notwithstanding its denial - that it is very much involved with the “alternative armed groups”. Sadly for Colombo its most effective “power” is not its armed forces or Police but the “assassins” of these “paramilitaries” and “deep penetration squads”. Moreover it hopes to counter the LTTE in war through the deployment of these groups particularly the Karuna faction. With the bona fides of the LTTE being in doubt over its genuineness in seeking a peaceful settlement the state simply cannot afford to disband or hand over the other groups to the LTTE. Whereas the top priority for the LTTE in Geneva will be this issue.

Under these circumstances the only “optimistic” silver lining in this dark “pessimistic” cloud is the fact that both sides have at least agreed to talk to each other directly in Geneva.This by itself is no cause for complacent satisfaction. Though Mahinda Rajapakse seems to be peering into the future of Geneva through rosy - tinted spectacles there are three doubtful areas about the future direction of the proposed confabulations.

One is whether the proposed Geneva talks will continue as scheduled if serious violence erupts. While the LTTE has to keep the so called civilian protests under check the state has to control the regular security forces along with the paramilitaries, deep penetration squads, homeguards and other alternative armed groups.

The next is about the outcome of these talks. Will there be satisfactory decisions reached and more importantly will those be implemented? The past in this respect does not offer much hope for the future.

The third is whether these talks will progress to a point where substantive issues pertaining to a lasting political settlement will be discussed?. The answer to all these questions lies in the sincerity and willingness of both sides to honour the four year old Ceasefire in letter and spirit.